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INTRODUCTION
A clear, efficient, and fair mechanism for resolving election disputes is
an important aspect of smooth presidential succession. It is also something
that our Constitution has lacked from its inception, and the adverse
consequences of its absence were most recently apparent in the 2000
election. The 1876 Hayes-Tilden election, which required an Electoral
Commission to resolve disputes about presidential electors, was the most
severe manifestation of this presidential succession gap. As such, it also
should have represented the best opportunity to fix the problem. Indeed,
shortly after the Senate passed the Electoral Commission bill, then
candidate Rutherford B. Hayes reflected that the occasion presented such an
opportunity to revisit the subject of presidential elections.
Before another Presidential Election this whole subject of the Presidential
Election ought to be thoroughly considered, and a radical change made. It
is probable that no wise measure can be devised which does not require an
amendment of the Constitution. Let proposed Amendments be maturely
considered. Something ought to be done immediately.1

Instead of wholesale reform and constitutional amendment, Congress spent
the next eleven years focusing its energy on a joint rule and then a statutory
fix to the problem. The resulting statute, the Electoral Count Act,2 is
confusing, unwieldy and fails to account for all the problems the
Constitution creates for disputed presidential elections. It also represents a
complete rejection of the Electoral Commission model. In this paper, we
piece together all congressional action on this matter in the aftermath of the
Hayes-Tilden 1876 election leading up to the passage of the Electoral Count
Act in an effort to explain why Congress missed this opportunity and turned
away from the Electoral Commission model.

1. RUTHERFORD BIRCHARD HAYES, DIARY & LETTERS OF RUTHERFORD BIRCHARD
HAYES: NINETEENTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 70–71 (D. MCKAY CO. 1964).
2. Pub. L. No. 98-456, 98 Stat. 1748 (codified at 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2006)).
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I. THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT PROBLEM
In another article we have detailed the problems and gaps that the
Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution has created for our system of
electing the President.3 Briefly, the Twelfth Amendment provides the joint
session of Congress with instructions for conducting the electoral vote.4
The Amendment is wordy, but the language that causes the most problems
is relatively short: “The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes
shall then be counted.”5 This is all the direction the Constitution provides
to the joint session, and one can quickly see the problems it creates if there
is a dispute. For instance, what does the language say about who is to count
or determine the validity of electoral votes? One can make the argument, as
some have, that this authority is vested exclusively in the President of the
Senate, with the two Houses being merely onlookers. Alternatively, as
others have claimed, one can contend that Congress has authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause6 to fill the gap that exists in the constitutional
text. The key point, however, is that because the constitutional ambiguity
remains unless and until there is a constitutional amendment to fix it,
different arguments can be made to support one or the other of these
interpretations depending on the politically strategic reasons for doing so.7
Even if it were settled who has the final constitutional authority to decide
which Electoral College votes from a state are entitled to be counted,
subsidiary questions arise over how to exercise this authority if there is a
dispute over electoral votes. For example, can the vote counter reject
votes? How should the vote counter choose among competing votes?
These are just a few of the questions posed by the text of the Twelfth
Amendment,8 and as we detailed in our article, many of the issues have
arisen in our history. The most glaring example was the Hayes-Tilden
Election Dispute.
A. The Hayes-Tilden Election Dispute and the Electoral Commission
The question of what to do when faced with competing electoral returns
from a single state reared its head in the Hayes-Tilden dispute. In the
aftermath of the 1876 presidential election, Congress was faced with thirtyfive disputed electoral votes from five states, enough to swing the election
either way.9 In three southern states, Florida, Louisiana, and South
3. Nathan L. Colvin & Edward B. Foley, The Twelfth Amendment: A Constitutional
Ticking Time Bomb, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475 (2010).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
5. Id.
6. U.S. CONST. art I § 8, cl. 18.
7. See generally Colvin & Foley, supra note 3, at 480–523.
8. For a list of others, see id. at 482–83.
9. CHARLES FAIRMAN, Five Justices and the Electoral Commission of 1877, in THE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 40–41 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz, eds., Supp. 1988). For another good
source on the Hayes-Tilden dispute generally, see PAUL LELAND HAWORTH, THE HAYESTILDEN DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876 (1966).
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Carolina, multiple electoral certificates were returned, along with
allegations of fraud, violence, voter intimidation, and corruption.10 In
Oregon, one elector was possibly ineligible which led to the submission of
two slates, one including the elector and another with a replacement from
the other political party.11 If Hayes received all of the disputed electoral
votes, he would prevail by a margin of one; therefore each dispute was
critical to the overall outcome.12
The Constitution was silent as to how to proceed and there was no
legislation governing the electoral count. Perhaps worse still, control of
Congress was split between the Democrats and Republicans, creating a
loggerhead.13 This was a true crisis in presidential succession. Without
some sort of compromise, there was concern that the Republicans, and the
President of the Senate specifically, would assert that he had the power to
declare Hayes President.14 Conversely, the Democrats might insist that,
with no agreement on what to do about the disputed Electoral College
votes, neither candidate had an outright majority and therefore it fell to the
House of Representatives to decide the winner.15 If neither side budged,
there would be a genuine stalemate resolvable only through the force of
arms. However, the two parties reached a compromise, agreeing to create a
bi-partisan Electoral Commission, comprised of five members from each
house (five Democrats and five Republicans) and four U.S. Supreme Court
Justices (thought to be two Democrats and two Republicans) who would
choose a fifth to join them.16 Initially, it was thought that the fifth justice
would be Justice David Davis, who was considered to be the most
independent member of the Court. However, in the midst of all this, Davis
was selected by the Illinois state legislature to the United States Senate.17
His replacement on the Commission, Justice Joseph P. Bradley, was
thought to be a Republican.18 These changes in the presumed composition
of the Commission made it, at least on its face, appear less evenly bi10. Colvin & Foley, supra note 3, at 502–04. Florida and Louisiana returned three
certificates while South Carolina returned two. Id.
11. Id. at 504–05.
12. Id. at 502–03.
13. Id. at 505–06.
14. George F. Edmunds, Presidential Elections, 12 AM. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1877). The
Republicans in the House were strong proponents of this view. Representative James A.
Garfield was indignant about the Senate’s decision to back the Commission, writing to
Rutherford B. Hayes that the Senate simply needed to “support its presiding officer in
following the early precedents, which were made under the fresh impulses of the
constitution.” 1 THEODORE CLARKE SMITH, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JAMES ABRAM
GARFIELD 629 (1925). Garfield took this position to the House floor for over an hour and he
ultimately received 79 of 83 votes to serve on the Commission from the party caucus. Id. at
630–31. As will be seen in this paper, many Democrats remained angry over this possibility
through the rest of the decade.
15. Samuel J. Tilden himself, and his most fervent followers, continued to assert this
position up until almost the very end, Inauguration Day, and there were fears that they were
lining up military officers to support this stance, with the consequence that another civil war
might erupt. Edmunds, supra note 14, at 3–4.
16. FAIRMAN, supra note 9, at 48–49.
17. Id. at 54.
18. Id.
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partisan.19 Congress was effectively bound to the Commission’s findings
unless both Houses rejected the findings, unlikely given the partisan split of
Congress.20
The key question for the Commission, from a legal standpoint, ultimately
turned on whether a state was entitled to alter the official determination of
which presidential electors won the state’s popular vote after the
congressionally specified date on which the electors were to cast their votes
for President. In Florida, the State’s canvassing board had declared the
Hayes electors to have won the popular vote, despite protests from Samuel
J. Tilden supporters. On the specified day in December, the Hayes electors
cast their votes for their candidates, and their votes were certified by the
State’s Governor. The Tilden electors met the same day, and got the State’s
Attorney General (a Democrat) to certify their vote. More significantly, in
January, the State had a new Governor—and a new legislature—and
pursuant to a new statute, the new Governor (also a Democrat) certified that
the Tilden electors had been the true popularly elected ones. The Electoral
Commission, on a straight party-line vote, split in ruling that the
certification of the Hayes electors was the only one in compliance with the
U.S. Constitution. In his decisive opinion, Justice Bradley explained his
view that the Constitution’s requirement that presidential electors in all
states cast their votes for President on the same day implicitly precluded a
state, like Florida, from subsequently determining that the wrong electors
had been certified winners of the popular vote. 21
B. Congress’s Missed Opportunity
In the aftermath of this experience, it was clear that Congress needed to
do something to fix the problem posed by the Twelfth Amendment.
However, it was not as if Congress was operating on a blank slate. Indeed,
since the first electoral count, Congress employed or proposed numerous
methods or bodies for resolving electoral count disputes, including joint
rules, legislation, constitutional amendments, committees, the Supreme
Court, and an Electoral Commission.22
During the eleven years of debate leading up to the Electoral Count Act,
many of these methods were debated. Congress could have reexamined and
modified the Electoral Commission model. While there was some wide
dissatisfaction with the way the Commission worked, it was not as if it was
19. Indeed, Hayes noted in his diary, upon the selection of Justice Joseph P. Bradley, the
odds of him prevailing in Washington D.C. had increased to five to one in his favor. HAYES,
supra note 1, at 71.
20. See FAIRMAN, supra note 9, at 49. It was conceivable that one side or the other
might claim unilateral authority to declare the winner even after the Commission’s ruling,
notwithstanding the statutory directive that both Houses needed to overturn a Commission
decision. But, as a practical matter, once the Commission ruled, public opinion would not
tolerate either side attempting to negate its decision unilaterally.
21. Colvin & Foley, supra note 3, at 507–16. Hayes himself described the votes as a
strictly “party” vote and noted that they demonstrated the “strength of party ties.” HAYES,
supra note 1, at 73.
22. See generally Colvin & Foley, supra note 3.
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a total failure.23 It would have been possible to adopt the general concept
while making modifications to reduce the partisanship and perception that
the outcome would be fait accompli. For instance, the number of
commissioners could have been reduced, members could have been selected
from outside Congress, and Congress could have determined a better way to
select a neutral tiebreaker by not limiting the pool to sitting Supreme Court
justices. However, Congress did not seriously consider employing the
Commission model. Instead, it adopted legislation that went back to the old
model of relying on Congress to resolve these disputes.
Moreover, the need to fix the problem with the Twelfth Amendment that
provoked the crisis of 1876 gave the nation and its leading statesmen the
opportunity to confront the role of political parties in democratic elections
in a way that the Framers of the Constitution (and even the Twelfth
Amendment) had not done. The problem that proved visible in 1876 was
one rooted in two-party conflict: neither side could rise above its partisan
desire to win the Presidency in order to resolve the vote-counting dispute
impartially, and therefore any institution charged with resolving this dispute
inevitably would act based on partisan motives if that institution was
dominated by one party or the other. This partisan dynamic was one that
had not been anticipated by the Framers, because they had hoped that they
had designed the Electoral College in a way to avoid the effects of
partisanships in presidential elections.24 Obviously, the Framers were
sorely mistaken in this respect, as became obvious by the election of
1800.25 But even as the Founding Generation adopted the Twelfth
23. The Commission model represented a bi-partisan compromise that averted a
potential crisis in presidential succession.
Because both sides considered acting
unilaterally—the Republicans through the President of the Senate, the Democrats through
the House—there were serious rumblings about the use of arms, and President Ulysses S.
Grant in fact deployed troops over concerns of civil unrest. The dispute never turned into
open warfare, and the Electoral Commission compromise led to a relatively peaceful
presidential succession. Norman J. Ornsetin, Three Disputed Elections: 1800, 1824, 1876, in
AFTER THE PEOPLE VOTE: A GUIDE TO THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 29, 35 (John C. Fortier ed.,
3d ed. 2004) (noting President Grant’s deployment of troops). Senator George F. Edmunds
defended the use of the Electoral Commission, later stating that he was certain that the
Senate would have declared Hayes as the winner and the House would have declared Tilden
as the winner with the resolution coming by a resulting armed conflict. Edmunds, supra note
14, at 3–4.
24. One of us has written on how this misunderstanding about the Electoral College was
part of a broader misunderstanding by the Founders on how partisanship would affect
disputed elections for the chief executive, whether governor or president. See Edward B.
Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore, 44 IND. L. REV. (forthcoming).
25. The most significant problem was that originally members of the Electoral College
could only vote for President. The Vice President would then be the candidate with the
second most votes. The Framers did not seem to anticipate that this might mean the Presidnt
and Vice President would be political enemies. To prevent this result, the members of the
Electoral College had to be especially strategic in casting their votes. In 1800, the
Democratic-Republicans failed at this task and cast the same number of votes for the
Presidential candidates (Thomas Jefferson) and his “running mate” Aaron Burr, tossing the
election to the House of Representatives. See generally SUSAN DUNN, JEFFERSON’S SECOND
REVOLUTION: THE ELECTION CRISIS OF 1800 AND THE TRIUMPH OF REPUBLICANISM (2004);
JOHN FERLING, ADAMS VS. JEFFERSON: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800 (2004);
EDWARD J. LARSON, A MAGNIFICENT CATASTROPHE: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800,
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Amendment to fix the defect in the Electoral College that had surfaced in
1800,the Founders did not have the foresight to use the Twelfth
Amendment as a vehicle to handle the problem of partisanship in a dispute
over counting ballots cast for a state’s presidential electors. The authors of
the Twelfth Amendment, had they been clairvoyant, could have designed a
neutral institution—better than the ad hoc Electoral Commission of 1877—
to handle this kind of dispute. But they did not. More significantly, in the
aftermath of the Electoral Commission’s work in 1877, the statesmen of
that time (if they had been acting in the public-minded spirit of the
Founders), now that they had experienced the consequences of partisan
motivations in the context of this type of dispute, could have created the
kind of balanced bipartisan institution that eluded the Founders. The fact
that the generation of leaders who lived through 1876–1877 did not create a
new institution to overcome the effects of partisanship in a disputed
presidential election is the most significant negative legacy of their
experience.
The 2000 presidential election brought Congress’s inadequate response
to the Hayes-Tilden dispute to the forefront. Again, Supreme Court justices
would play a pivotal role in resolving the dispute, this time sitting as a court
and deciding Bush v. Gore.26 The Electoral Count Act failed to resolve all
the problems and questions created by the Constitution. Had the Supreme
Court declined to intervene, it is quite possible, perhaps even likely, that
two slates of electors, one favoring Al Gore and one favoring George W.
Bush, would have been sent to Congress.27 In 2000 the Congress was
divided: the House was Republican and the Senate was tied, with Al Gore
having the authority to cast the tiebreaking vote. Predicting how that
Congress would have reacted to such a scenario is an impossible task.28
This scenario, and the crisis it would have created, provide the best
justification for the Supreme Court’s intervention in the 2000 election.29
Like 1876, the 2000 election dispute represents another presidential
succession crises averted, less than a year before the September 11th
attacks.30
AMERICA’S FIRST PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (2007); BERNARD A. WEISBERGER, AMERICA
AFIRE: JEFFERSON, ADAMS, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY ELECTION OF 1800 (2000).
26. 531 U.S. 98 (2000), cert granted, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000). Perhaps it was appropriate
that again it appeared U.S. Supreme Court Justice Kennedy, like Justice Joseph P. Bradley in
1876, held the fate of the election in his hands as the “swing vote.”
27. Indeed, the Florida legislature was prepared to appoint a George W. Bush slate of
electors in the event the Supreme Court did not intervene. Colvin & Foley, supra note 3, at
529 n.282.
28. For some speculation on various scenarios, see Colvin & Foley, supra note 3, at
522–23, 528–31.
29. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1046, 1047 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that grant of certiorari
was necessary to prevent “casting a cloud” upon the legitimacy of the election); RICHARD A.
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 327–31 (2003) (summarizing possible
scenarios, problems with the Electoral Count Act (ECA) and the crises that the Court’s
intervention averted).
30. POSNER supra note 29, at 331 (“Had the worst-case scenario that the decision averted
come to pass, the forty-third President would have taken office after long delay, with no
transition, with greatly impaired authority, perhaps amid unprecedented partisan bickering
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Thus, the primary lesson of 1876 and 2000 is that our constitutional
system for resolving presidential election disputes is flawed. The Congress
of 1887 thought it was addressing this problem, but even they knew that
their legislation was a less-than-ideal substitute for a much-needed
constitutional amendment, and the lesson of 2000 is that the Electoral
Count Act is woefully inadequate. Together, the two disputes demonstrate
the need for a neutral institution to resolve election disputes, something in
the likeness of the flawed but successful Electoral Commission. This paper
will explain why the Electoral Count Act prevailed where other ideas, such
as a neutral body, joint rules, or constitutional amendments, failed.
Additionally, the paper should shed light as to why it took Congress eleven
years to reach a resolution in the aftermath of Hayes-Tilden and why the
resulting legislation was so confusing.31 Our hope is that this historical
inquiry will also create a foundation for considering how politicians and
scholars might fix the problem and fill this gap in the law of presidential
succession.32
II. CONGRESS’S RESPONSE TO THE HAYES-TILDEN DISPUTE
Because of the length of this article and complexity of the legislative
history, we decided that it would be easier on the reader to explain some
conclusions at the outset. First, a primary driver for the difficulty of fixing
the electoral count was the diversity of opinions on the subject in Congress.
The only point of agreement was that there was a problem that required
resolution, and we did not come across a statement from a member of
Congress suggesting that they should do nothing. But beyond that, opinions
were divided, often in many directions, on nearly every single aspect of
resolving the problem.
In this respect, the debate, particularly early on, differs from how we
understand the way legislation is often crafted. Here, perhaps surprisingly,
and bitterness, leaving a trail of poisonous suspicion of covert deals and corrupt maneuvers,
and after an interregnum unsettling to the global and the U.S. domestic economy and
possibly threatening world peace.”).
31. One scholar, shortly after the passage of the Electoral Count Act, described it as
“[t]he most complicated bit of governmental machinery which the modern world has to
exhibit.” John W. Burgess, The Law of the Electoral Count, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 633 (1888). For a
thorough discussion of the resulting legislation, see Stephen A. Siegel, The Conscientious
Congressman’s Guide to the Electoral Count Act of 1887, 56 FLA. L. REV. 541 (2004). See
also Eric Schickler, Terri Bimes & Robert W. Mickey, Safe at Any Speed: Legislative
Intent, the Electoral Count Act of 1887, and Bush v. Gore, 16 J.L. & POL. 717 (2000). The
possible unconstitutionality of the Electoral Count Act has also been addressed. Vasan
Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653 (2002).
32. Our work on this topic has included an exercise using a model election court based
on a McCain v. Obama hypothetical case. The project was co-sponsored by Election Law @
Moritz, the AEI-Brookings Election Reform Project, and the Supreme Court Institute. In an
effort to create a neutral body, the model court was composed of two judges from different
backgrounds who came together to select a third member of the panel. For more information
on
the
project,
see
Election
Law
@
Moritz,
Election
Court,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/index.php. See also Edward B. Foley, The McCain v.
Obama Simulation: A Hypothetical Variation on Bush v. Gore (forthcoming, draft on file
with author).
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partisan legislative politics did not organize views into two competing
teams. Instead, members from both parties offered a wide variety of
proposals. Two-party conflict may have been a factor in preventing any
legislative solution until 1887, but two-party conflict cannot be the sole
explanation for the cacophony of congressional voices on this topic.
For instance, members of Congress could not agree on the appropriate
method to resolve the problem: constitutional amendment, legislation, or
joint rule. They disagreed about who possessed the power to conduct the
count: the President of the Senate, the Houses acting together, the two
Houses acting separately, or the two Houses acting together and voting as
state delegations. They disagreed as to whether a legislative act would bind
a future Congress on the matter. On what would prove to be one of the
more important sources of disagreement, they disagreed about whether they
might come up with a new system, perhaps vesting the power to count in
the Supreme Court or Chief Justice. Members of Congress disagreed about
the extent of the power to conduct the electoral count, about how much
deference to give the states, or whether Congress could even reject returns.
Problematic in all of these opinions was that they often did not avail to
compromise. For instance, an adamant believer that a constitutional
amendment is necessary could not possibly compromise with someone who
believed that Congress could legislate on the matter. As will be seen, some
of these arguments were likely grounded in partisan or institutional
concerns, but there are several cases of individuals taking stances to their
own party’s or institution’s detriment.
Second, it does not appear that Congress seriously considered adopting
the model of the Electoral Commission or some alternative. This was true
despite the fact that a framer of the Electoral Commission,33 Senator
George F. Edmunds, was also the primary author of the Electoral Count
Act. Professor Stephen A. Siegel, in his own review of the Electoral Count
Act’s (ECA’s) legislative history for a different purpose than ours,34 was
uncertain whether this was because Congress believed that the job belonged
to them, as a matter of policy, or because Congress believed a constitutional
amendment was necessary to create a different arbiter.35 Additionally, the
legislative history reveals two more explanations. First, there was overall
dissatisfaction with the Electoral Commission, particularly from the
Democrats who found themselves in control of Congress soon after the
Hayes election. Second, at the start of the debates the Democrats in
Congress were in complete control for the first time in a long time and
33. Obituary, George F. Edmunds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1919, at 11.
34. Siegel sought to discern the true meaning of the ECA and to advise modern-day
members of Congress on how to enforce the statute’s directives. Our goal is to understand
why Congress missed the opportunity that it had in the aftermath of 1877 to fix the problem
inherent in the Twelfth Amendment.
35. Siegel, supra note 31, at 555 (“[I]t is unclear whether the failure to legislate some
tribunal other than Congress as the ultimate arbiter of the electoral count was because
Congress believed, as a matter of policy, it should not move it elsewhere, or because
Congress believed that in the absence of a constitutional amendment, it could not move the
responsibility elsewhere.”).
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viewed the Electoral Commission as one event in a line of Republican
abuses going back to the Twenty-Second Joint Rule.36
This point leads to the third conclusion, which is that early failures to
compromise by Congress were a result of this partisanship. Some
Democrats wished to operate under their own version of the TwentySecond Joint Rule, which would make rejecting electoral votes easy.
Knowing the Republican President would never sign that type of bill, the
Democrats sought to create a joint rule. Later, only when congressional
control was split between the parties did the congressional actors move
beyond the idea of using a joint rule and insisting on legislation. It seems it
was necessary for congressional control to be split between the political
parties in order to cool partisan temptations. The debate becomes much
more civil and serious when this happens and eventually leads to a
resolution.
The fourth conclusion is that once congressional control split between the
parties, the substance of the debate was also altered. The concern during
the debate was less about which party will receive an advantage, but rather
whether the proposal would give more power to one of the two Houses of
Congress. This led to further delay in a resolution.
Moreover, there were several close presidential elections during the
period of Congress’s attempts to fix the system. The final conclusion is that
the close presidential elections did not appear to play a central role in the
debates or passage of the legislation. Members of Congress were certainly
aware of the close calls, but they do not feature prominently in the debates
and members rarely mentioned them. At the same time, it is difficult to
imagine particularly close elections not impacting the mindset of Congress.
Thus, this conclusion is tentative and may need revision upon further
research into historical archives.37

36. For the full text of the Twenty-Second Joint Rule, see H. Subcomm. On Compilation
of Precedents, Counting Electoral Votes, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 44-13, at 256 (2d Sess. 1877).
The Twenty-Second Joint Rule was the strongest display of Congress’s counting power. If a
member of Congress objected to a state’s votes, both Houses would have to agree to count
the votes or they would be rejected. Under this rule Congress rejected the votes of several
southern states in three elections, the only time it ever did this. Colvin & Foley, supra note 3,
at 497–99.
37. One possible explanation is that Congress faced too many significant issues during
this period. Civil service reform, civil rights and voting reform, presidential succession,
tariffs, maintenance of the gold standard, immigration, and race relations in the aftermath of
Reconstruction were all issues on the national agenda during the period. Still, it would seem
possible for Congress to have carved out time for a constitutional amendment had there been
the political will. Congress, after all, was able to adopt the Twentieth Amendment in 1933,
which also concerns presidential elections, during the Great Depression.
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A. Forty-Fifth Congress 1877: Republicans Control the Senate and the
Democrats Control the House of Representatives
1. The House of Representatives Considers a Constitutional Amendment
The 45th Congress did not feature much serious movement toward
solving the problems posed by the Twelfth Amendment, except for some
constitutional amendment proposals. In the earliest action following the
Hayes-Tilden dispute, Representative Milton I. Southard (D, OH)
introduced a resolution to form a committee consisting of eleven members
for “consideration of the state of law respecting the ascertainment and
declaration of the result of the election of President.”38 The resolution was
a response to a committee already formed by the Senate that was authorized
to work with any committee from the House.39
This committee, officially entitled the Committee on the State of the Law
Respecting the Ascertainment and Declaration of Result of Election of
President and Vice-President, produced a report and suggested amendment
to the Constitution in May 1878.40 The majority of the Committee,
unsurprisingly, found that the electoral system was a failure:
Every reason originally alleged for it has been refuted by experience; its
operation is inequitable and cannot be otherwise; it is aristocratic in its
nature; it was founded in distrust of the people and intended as a check
upon popular will; it is peculiarly open to treachery and fraud, and it has
brought the country to the verge of revolution and anarchy repeatedly.41

This language, particularly the concern about fraud and anarchy, certainly
harkened back to the nation’s collective experience in the previous
presidential election. The fundamental change proposed to the electoral
system was to change the allocation of electoral votes in each state while
preserving the Electoral College. Rather than a candidate winning all of a
state’s electoral votes, the proposal divided each state’s electoral votes
proportionally among the candidates according to the number of votes they
received in each state.42
The upshot of this plan was primarily two fold. First, and likely most
important, the majority felt that it was a more accurate expression of the
entire country’s preference for a particular candidate. This would be
accomplished by reducing the likelihood of an election going to the House
and doing away with the notion that a one-vote victory by a candidate in a
38. 6 CONG. REC. 132 (1877).
39. Id.
40. H.R. REP. No. 819 (1878).
41. Id. at 1–2.
42. Id. at 13. Specifically, the math in the amendment required multiplying the total
votes that the candidate received in a state by the whole number of that state’s electoral votes
and then dividing that number by the total number of votes cast in that state. That number
would be kept to the third decimal and would be the number of electoral votes the candidate
received for that state. Id. For example, in the election of 1876 New York had thirty-five
electoral votes. Under this system, Hayes would have received 16.9 of New York’s votes to
Tilden’s 18.031. Id. at 12.
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particular state would net the entirety of that state’s electoral votes.43
Second, the majority argued that this plan tended to prevent or reduce the
impact of election fraud. Noting that under the current plan a local fraud in
New York, Philadelphia, or Cincinnati had the potential to swing an
election in New York, Pennsylvania, or Ohio—and then perhaps the
nation—the majority argued that under this plan such a fraud would have a
much smaller impact, to the point that parties might not be willing to
engage in such activities.44
Indeed the same point is stronger when one considers the fact that it
would have changed the nature of not only fraud but also all election
disputes or snafus in presidential elections. Taking Florida in 2000 as an
example, some believe the butterfly ballot in Palm Beach County might
have been sufficient to cost Florida’s electoral votes for Al Gore. Under
this proposal, the impact of the ballot problem would have paled in
comparison. In fact, it is difficult to imagine that the problem would have
resulted in any dispute at all.
The majority’s proposed amendment also included a provision for the
counting of electoral votes in Congress. The language would have replaced
the dreaded passive language in the Twelfth Amendment that left open the
question of who counts the votes. In the proposed amendment, the
President of the Senate would open the votes, but “the electoral votes
[would] then be counted by the two houses, as certified, unless rejected by
both houses.”45 In the event of an election dispute in a state, the highest
judicial tribunal to pass on the dispute was to transmit the decision to the
President of the Senate and the Houses were bound to follow that decision
unless both disagreed with it.46 If there were a dispute but no certificate of
decision, the votes would only be counted if both Houses agreed.47
Furthermore,
[i]f there be more than one certificate of electoral votes from any State,
and no such judicial decision as aforesaid, or if there be more than one
such decision from any State, in either case that certificate of electoral
votes which shall be held by both houses to be made by the rightful
authority, and that judicial decision which shall be held in like manner to
be made by the rightful tribunal, shall be conclusive, and the votes be
counted accordingly, unless rejected by both houses.48

Finally, rather than requiring a candidate to receive a majority of the votes,
the proposed amendment required only a plurality. In the event of a tie,
which was highly unlikely under the amendment due to the use of fractions,
the vote would immediately go to the House of Representatives as under the
original plan.49
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The minority report50 of the Committee took issue with the majority’s
assertion that the early plan was aristocratic in nature and did not always
reflect the will of the entire people.51 They insisted that this was not a flaw
of the system, but the point: the election of the president was to be “the will
of the States, expressed in such manner as through their several legislatures
they might direct . . . [not] as a means of arriving at the aggregate voice of
all the people of the United States.52 In effect, the minority argued, the
proposed amendment would violate principles of federalism and states’
rights, which were fundamental compromises of the Constitution.53 The
minority also disagreed with the majority’s contention that the proposed
amendment would lessen corruption and fervor.54 They argued, instead,
that this would increase passions in states where elections were once
considered to be foregone conclusions.55 As to whether this plan would
reduce contested elections, the minority insisted that instead it would
nationalize and increase contests as parties hoped to gain fractions all across
the country in hopes of offsetting fractions they lose in other states.56
Whatever the merits of the debate between the majority and dissenting
members of the committee, the majority’s proposal suffered two defects
that would plague future efforts at reforming the Twelfth Amendment.
First, not content with only fixing the procedures for resolving disputes
over ballots cast for presidential electors, the proposal attempted to tackle
the far more controversial issue of how to distribute Electoral College
votes. The proposal’s plan for proportional distribution might be better
than the largely prevailing system of winner-take-all (today, only Maine
and Nebraska use a type of proportional system), but getting this idea to
secure enough support for a constitutional amendment has proven
impossible throughout U.S. history. Therefore, any reform of dispute
resolution procedures that is attached to broader Electoral College reform,
like the proportionality proposal, has little chance of adoption. Second,
even insofar as this proposal focused on dispute resolution, it felt compelled
50. The majority members of the Committee were not listed in the report. The minority
members were H.A. Herbert (D, AL), John. F. House (D, TN), and Eppa Hunton (D, VA),
all Democrats. See id. at 23. Assuming the remaining members of the Committee were in
the majority, those members would have included, Milton Southard (R, OH), Clarkson N.
Potter (D, NY), George Bicknell (D, IN), John G. Carlisle (D, KY), Benjamin Butler (R,
MA), Curtis H. Brogden (R, NC) and Ezekiel S. Sampson (R, IA). Standing and Select
Committees of the House of Representatives , 45th Cong., 3d Sess., H Misc. Doc. No. 2, at
11.
51. Id. at 15.
52. Id. at 16.
53. Id. at 18–19. The minority also noted that nothing was stopping the states from
adopting a plan similar to this. Id. at 20.
54. Id. at 20.
55. Id. (“The plan of the committee, giving importance to the ballot of every voter in the
Union, making every one of eight millions and a half of voters feel that the result might
depend upon him, would set fire to every State in the Union at once . . . . The same reasoning
shows that frauds would be perpetrated in States where it is now useless to attempt them.”).
56. Id. at 21. Going further, the minority insisted that this would result in further federal
encroachment on power in the southern states because of the constant concern of
intimidation. Id.
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to give both Houses of Congress, as distinct institutions, a role in the
dispute-resolution process.
To be sure, the proposal stated the concurrence of both Houses would be
necessary in certain circumstances: for example, both Houses would need
to agree to count Electoral College votes that lacked state certification,
while both Houses would need to agree to reject Electoral College votes
with state certification. The problem with this sort of procedure is that
there might be a dispute about whether or not the state certification existed
(or, similarly, whether an authoritative state judicial decision existed). If
the two Houses disagreed on the existence of the condition precedent, then
the same sort of recipe for a disastrous stalemate existed. After 1877,
members of Congress should have recognized the need for a single federal
institution to be the ultimate authority concerning disputed presidential
elections, but the jealousy of each House to maintain a distinct institutional
role in the process was too great to permit learning this obvious lesson.
2. Senator Edmunds Responds to the Proposed Amendment and Lays the
Foundation for the Electoral Count Act
Senator George F. Edmunds was perhaps the most important actor in the
attempts to reform the election system. A Republican from Vermont, he
was an architect of the Electoral Commission and also served as a member
of the Commission. In the Senate, Edmunds was a leader of the Republican
Party and President Pro Tempore of the Senate during much of this era.57
The Edmunds Bill, as it was often called, would eventually become the
Electoral Count Act. Thus, his early impressions on the subject are
especially relevant. Edmunds published a law review article on the subject
in October of 1877.58 In the article, Presidential Elections, Edmunds gave
his opinion on the Electoral Commission, the proposed Amendment, and
alternatives to the Amendment. 59
Regarding the Electoral Commission, Edmunds viewed the gravity of the
situation as one that “led men of all parties and all views in Congress to
unite, as one of the simplest and plainest duties of patriotism, in a measure
of legislation that should peacefully solve the difficulty.”60 Edmunds wrote
that three characteristics of the Commission were notable in its defense.
First, the Commission acted uniformly, like a court, allowing the entire
body to answer questions conclusively.61 Second, the Commission
included five Supreme Court justices “taken from a body of men learned in
57. Edmunds served as President Pro Tempore from 1883–1885 and Chairman of the
Republican Conference from 1885–1891. Biography of George Franklin Edmunds,
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774–PRESENT,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=E000056 (last visited Nov. 11,
2010).
58. Edmunds, supra note 14. Furthermore, the solution “was not, perhaps the best
theoretically possible, but it was the best practically possible on that occasion.” Id. at 6.
59. See generally id.
60. Id. at 4.
61. Id. This was, of course, in comparison to the idea of the two Houses attempting to
answer the same questions, which was highly unlikely. See id.
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the law, withdrawn from active politics, and dependent neither upon the
favor of the people, of Congress, or the Executive for the permanence of
their official positions.”62 Third, the Commission was to rule on the issues
before it “according to the law as it stood before the passage of the act” to
ensure that the “lawful President was to be ascertained by the same law in
every respect that existed on the day of the election.”63 It is striking how
little Edmunds’ own proposal incorporated the strengths of the Commission
as he viewed it.
Edmunds wanted reform. It was the details of the reform that proved
troublesome. In responding to the committee’s work, Edmunds started with
common ground: the passing of the 1877 crisis did not abrogate Congress’s
“imperative duty of providing in advance, so far as clear provisions of the
Constitution or a statute can do, for the disposition of similar dangers and
disputes in the future.”64 However, the proposed amendment, according to
Edmunds, was the wrong approach to this problem. Here, Edmunds largely
agreed with the minority report that the Amendment would in effect
nationalize the presidential election, cause more problems with disputes,
and lead to a more autocratic Presidency.65
Instead, Edmunds outlined his vision for a solution. Any law, Edmunds
posited, must first address “[h]ow far can Congress, under the Constitution,
authorize any federal tribunal, be it the Houses of Congress, a board, or a
court, to go in determining the validity of an Electoral vote.”66 On this
point, Edmunds viewed the “act of the counting commanded by the
Constitution only as an administrative, not as a judicial, ceremony.”67
Instead, it would be ideal if “the disputes touching the constitution of the
Electoral Colleges in the States could be disposed of in advance [of the
counting of the votes]” and “it would be safer for the peace order and
justice of the Republic in the long run, to have such disputes settled by
honest judicial means in the States in which they may occur.”68 Thus,
Edmunds hoped that an amendment to the Constitution could be avoided if
states would be willing to resolve the disputes in advance of the voting of
the Electors and Congress would bind itself to such a decision.69 As will be
seen, the spirit of Edmunds’ hopes would be later captured in the Electoral
Count Act.
It is remarkable that Edmunds, so involved with this issue, did not see the
overriding need for a new constitutional amendment to fix the defects of the
Twelfth Amendment. Equally outstanding, after 1877, is his thought that a
62. Id. at 6–7. Edmunds acknowledged that perhaps bias exists in each person, but
maintained that at least the federal judiciary was the most insulated from the temptations and
fears that reign over politicians. Id. at 7.
63. Id. at 7.
64. Id. at 9.
65. See id. at 9–15.
66. Id. at 16.
67. Id. at 17.
68. Id. at 18. Edmunds did not argue that these tribunals would be flawless, just better
more often than not than the exercise of some centralized power, like Congress. Id.
69. Id. at 18–19.
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dispute over a state’s presidential ballots could be conclusively resolved in
the state itself, rather than in a national institution. To be sure, consistent
with the values of federalism, one might hope—and even instruct—the
authoritative national institution to bind itself to the decision of a state’s
tribunal. But one still needed to identify the single federal national
institution that would declare a President duly elected. As long as there was
the possibility that someone would argue the need to ignore the state’s
tribunal’s decision—and after 1877 it was inevitable that this sort of
argument could not be foreclosed—then to avoid anarchy there needed to
be a national institution authorized to reject that claim and pronounce that
the ruling of the state tribunal would be followed. Edmunds’ failure to
recognize this basic point is baffling and would prove to be the Achilles
Heel of the statute he authored.
Senator Edmunds seemed to believe that federal courts could, or perhaps
should, be able to review the actions of state courts, to determine “whether
the State law had been followed, just as in many cases of federal judicial
jurisdiction they so act, and yet take as the best proof of the State law the
judgment of the highest State courts.”70 If this exercise of power was
appropriate, Edmunds suggested that legislation “be made for a prompt
review of the decisions of the State courts by the Supreme Court of the
United States, so that before the counting of the Electoral votes every
dispute concerning title to the office of Elector would be lawfully disposed
of.”71
In order to ensure enough time, Edmunds suggested holding the elections
on the first of September and requiring the Electors to cast their votes on
the first of January.72 Edmunds’ contemplation of a role for the U.S.
Supreme Court does suggest some recognition on his part for a national
institution to have the ultimate authority. But insofar as he wanted to add
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction legislatively to the existing framework of
the Twelfth Amendment rather than modify the Twelfth Amendment itself,
Edmunds remained confused about who exercised final authority. What if
either the House or the Senate disagreed with the Supreme Court’s ruling?
Or either the House or the Senate believed that the Supreme Court went
beyond the scope of its statutory jurisdiction, or that this statutory
jurisdiction was unconstitutional? One could not give the Supreme Court
final authority without also explicitly revoking that authority from the two
Houses of Congress.
Thus, it seems Edmunds believed in three distinct roles for three different
types of bodies to determine the valid electoral vote. First, the vote
canvassing belonged to the state’s administrative mechanisms. Second, the
dispute resolution belonged to the designated state tribunals and possibly
the federal judiciary for an abuse of discretion type review. Third, the vote
counting, after these disputes were resolved, was to be done by Congress,

70. Id. at 18.
71. Id. at 19.
72. Id. at 18.
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but should be a rather mechanical exercise. But 1877 showed the inability
to keep this last stage merely mechanical.
For the third function, Edmunds admitted that if one party controlled
Congress, the decisions of the states and/or judiciary might be ignored.73
Though less than ideal, he thought it was a danger in only the most extreme
circumstances and his model would have reduced it. However, in the ideal,
Edmunds thought:
If it were possible to find or to constitute one single tribunal, having final
power to count the votes and declare the result after the States had,
through their tribunals, disposed of disputes, being the farthest possible
removed from the heat of political prejudice, and possessing from its
character and constitution the general confidence of the country, the best
method of ascertaining who had been elected President would be
reached.74

Here, “judicial tribunals are best calculated to hear and decide disputed
questions of law and fact, although they may involve inquiries extending
into the domain of politics and the decision of the fact of an election.”75 On
this, however, Edmunds noted that a movement to give such a duty to the
Supreme Court was defeated.76 Such proposals were made during and after
1877, but they never seemed to garner much support. Edmunds concluded,
for unknown reasons, that there was not support in Congress for such a
change, but predicted that at some time in the future, the function would be
removed from the political branch and assigned to some sort of judicial
tribunal.77 While Congress would adopt much of Edmunds’ vision, these
latter two sentiments would fail to become part of the debate. In other
words, Edmunds’ best insights went unfulfilled. He saw the need for a
national adjudicatory tribunal but failed to press for it. Nor does it appear
that he pushed for replacing Congress as the vote counter, perhaps because
this would have required constitutional amendment, something Edmunds
sought to avoid.
Whether Edmunds should be charged with a failure of vision or a failure
of leadership, the bottom line is that he did not push for the kind of reforms
that were necessary after 1877. It is possible that Edmunds simply
determined that systemic reform was impossible—still he recognized that it
was needed and certainly could have made an effort.

73. Id. at 19 (“It may be thought that, in high party excitements, both when the two
Houses of Congress are impressed with the same bias, and when they are in opposition,
preliminary decisions will be disregarded . . . and thus there will still be danger.”).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 19–20.
76. Id. at 20.
77. Id. Legislators, he maintained, were ill-suited for such questions, “as they affect the
right of the people at large, as well as private rights, and depend exclusively upon preexisting laws and events, and require for their solution only a discovery and declaration of
them.” Id.
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3. Other Early Proposals
The amendment to apportion the electoral votes into districts appears to
have been the most serious proposal immediately following the 1876
dispute because it came from the Committee. However, the House did not
vote on it, for reasons still undiscovered.78 In 1877, Senator William W.
Eaton (D, CT) proposed an amendment that would have required the states
to create election dispute tribunals.79 The governor in each state would
appoint at least five people, with the advice of the state senate, to the
tribunal at least one year before the presidential election.80
The evenhandedness of this amendment would have seemed to depend
entirely on the state governor’s party and state senate’s majority party. The
legislature would then direct the tribunal to hear cases of contested elections
and the tribunal would determine and certify the case thirty days before the
electors voted.81 Oddly, the amendment would not have bound Congress to
the state’s decision. Later proposed amendments simply empowered the
joint convention of both Houses of Congress acting as one body to judge
the electoral returns, or alternatively referred disputes to the Supreme Court,
the highest state court, or Congress as a whole.82 As will be seen, parts of
these proposed amendments would find their way, in part, into the ECA.
No proposals for constitutional amendment were brought to a vote in the
decade after 1876.83 Indeed,

78. HERMAN V. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY 98 (1897).
79. Id. at 121.
A tribunal for the decision of all contested issues arising in the choice of the
electors of President and Vice-President shall be appointed in each State, in the
manner following, to wit: Not less than twelve months prior to the time fixed by
law for the choice of electors, the governor of each State shall, by and with the
advice and consent of the senate of the State, appoint not less than five persons
learned in the law and otherwise duly qualified, to whom shall be referred, in such
manner as the Legislature of the State shall direct, all cases of contested election
arising in reference to electors of President and Vice-President. And it shall be the
duty of the tribunal so constituted to hear and determine every such contest, and to
certify, thirty days at least before the day upon which the electors shall be called
upon to give their votes, their decision therein to the proper returning officer or
officers of the State, and to transmit an authenticated copy thereof, under the seal
of the State, to the seat of Government of the United States, directed to the
President of the Senate.
No person shall be eligible to the office of judge of elections who shall not have
the qualifications required by law for judicial office in the State of which he is a
citizen. The term of office of the said judges of election shall expire upon the day
fixed by law for the oath of office to be taken by the President and Vice-President
elect of the United States, for the term ensuing after their appointment, and before
entering upon the discharge of their duties they shall be sworn to a faithful
performance of the same.
6 CONG. REC. 415 (1877).
80. AMES, supra note 78, at 121.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 115–16.
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[t]he fact that it was impossible to secure the indorsement [sic] of any one
of the plans proposed in the years succeeding the contested election of
1876 by even one branch of Congress indicates that the adoption of a new
system of electing the Chief Magistrate is improbable before the present
method of amending the Constitution is itself changed.84

This point, that amending the Constitution is incredibly difficult, plays a
significant role in framing the entire approach to reform. Senator Edmunds
recognized this difficulty in his law review article, as he advocated
legislating within the confines of the Constitution’s text, rather than
changing the text. With members of Congress resigned to the idea that a
constitutional amendment was an impossible task, creative proposals to the
problem were limited to any legislative solution that was consistent with the
Twelfth Amendment.
Arguably, however, these members of Congress were too quick to
abandon the idea of a constitutional amendment, even recognizing its great
difficulty. After all, there have been other constitutional amendments
concerning presidential elections and transitions: the Twelfth itself, the
Twentieth, and the Twenty-Fifth. Moreover, in 1934 Senator George
Norris came two votes shy in the Senate of sending an additional
amendment to the states.85 Therefore, had there been a concerted effort to
adopt a well-tailored amendment dealing with the problem of disputed
presidential ballots, it could have mustered enough support at some point
during the decade between 1877 and 1887.
B. Forty-Sixth Congress 1880: The Democrats Control Both Houses
For the first time in decades, Democrats controlled both Houses of
Congress in 1880. It seems clear from the debates that the Democrats
harbored resentment over the Hayes-Tilden dispute and perceived
Republican abuse under the Twenty-Second Joint Rule in the 1860s. This
resentment played a significant role in the debate as the Democrats went
back to investigate the 1876 election, and their main proposal was another
joint rule. Even though the Democrats chafed under the Republican use of
the earlier joint rule, the Democrats sought payback rather than fair-minded
reform. Despite the Democratic control of both Houses, however, the 46th
Congress was unable to enact a rule or piece of legislation, which
demonstrates the diversity of opinions on this subject.
1. The Senate Considers a Joint Rule or Bill for the Electoral Count
On May 6, 1880, Senator John Tyler Morgan (D, AL) introduced a joint
rule, Senate Res. 1712, for the counting of electoral votes.86 The proposal
required at least two Senators and three House members to sign any
84. Id. at 113.
85. Caitlyn Nestleroth, Senator George W. Norris’s 1934 Constitutional Amendment
Relating to Disputed Presidential Elections (May 14, 2010) (paper on file with author); see
also 78 Cong. Rec. 9245 (1934).
86. 10 CONG. REC. 3547 (1880).
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objection to votes.87 If there was a valid objection to a state’s vote the two
Houses were to split and consider the objection separately, until both
Houses resolved the objections, at which time they were to meet again.88 If
only one list of votes was received from a state, the rule required both
Houses to concur in order to reject the votes.89 However,
[i]f more than one list of votes of electors from any State, or paper
purporting to be such list, has been submitted to each House for its
decision upon objections made thereto, and it shall appear that the Houses
have not concurred in receiving either of said lists, they shall each be
declared by the President of the Senate, in the presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives, as being rejected; and no list of votes of
electors so rejected shall be afterward read in the presence of the two
Houses except for information.90

Thus, in the event of multiple returns, both Houses would have to concur to
accept the returns. The proposal also provided for a separate opportunity to
challenge electors or their individual votes. In the event of this challenge,
the Houses would again separate to consider the objections, but no vote
would be rejected unless both Houses concurred.91 The Bill was referred to
the Special Committee on the Elections of President and Vice-President,
which Senator Morgan chaired.92
On May 20, 1880, Senator Morgan reported back to say that the Bill was
postponed indefinitely.93 On May 21, Senator Morgan moved to have the
joint rule considered by the Senate and the motion was agreed to.94 The
next day, the proposed rule was read again and the only significant change
to the initial proposal was to remove the separate procedure for considering
objections to the electors.95
Senator Morgan went on to explain the rationale behind the proposed
rule, starting with the legislative power to create such a rule. He explained
that the statutes already passed by Congress likely exhausted the extent to
87. Id. at 3654.
88. Id.
89. Id. Senator John Tyler Morgan made clear that his intent was to move away from
the previous Twenty-Second Joint Rule that allowed either of the two Houses to reject the
votes of a state far too easily in a way that violated the Constitution. Id. at 3655.
90. Id. at 3052. It appears that Senator Morgan thought that there was no alternative to
rejecting all slates if both Houses disagreed. He believed the idea that Congress could
compel a state to follow a certain procedure and then give presumptive approval to the
certificate that resulted from that procedure to be an affront to the power of the states. The
possibility of total disenfranchisement was as far as Senator Morgan would go to incentivize
the states to resolve their disputes. Id. at 3656.
91. Id. at 3052.
92. Id.; see also JOINT RULE FOR COUNTING THE VOTES OF ELECTORS OF PRESIDENT AND
VICE-PRESIDENT, SENATE MISC. DOC. NO. 90 (1880).
93. 10 CONG. REC. at 3547.
94. Id. at 3608. The following day, Senator Morgan noted that this was a strict party
line vote. Id. at 3653. Removing the provision on challenging electors was likely because
another bill, S. 1687, was introduced to deal with this directly. Id. at 3656. This bill would
have made it a crime for anyone ineligible to be an elector, or improperly assuming the role
of an elector, to cast a vote. Id.
95. Id. at 3652–53.
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which Congress was authorized to legislate in regard to the presidential
election.96 Once the electoral certificates reached the two Houses of
Congress, this legislative power ended and “the jurisdiction of the Senate
and House of Representatives to count the votes and ascertain the persons
elected takes full effect.”97 Senator Morgan suggested that many believed
Congress could go no further in controlling the count “without invading the
constitutional jurisdiction of this great tribunal.”98 Furthermore, Senator
Morgan noted that other than the Electoral Commission Act and perhaps the
Twenty-Second Joint Rule, Congress had been unwilling to use legislation
to control its discretionary exercise of the right to count votes.99
Senator Morgan also noted that Abraham Lincoln signed the joint
resolution but included a statement maintaining he had no right to interfere
in the counting of electoral votes under the Twelfth Amendment and that he
had no room to veto the resolution even if he so desired.100 This rejection
of the power of Congress to regulate the counting of the vote by legislation
meant that they could only do so by “concurrent agreement” or by
constitutional amendment.101 Until such an amendment was adopted,
Senator Morgan maintained that Congress must use the joint rules, even
though those rules might only be “binding as a matter of comity between
the two Houses.”102 It was, therefore, Congress’s duty, “in advance of
another election, to adopt some rules that will be just to all parties at all
times and under all circumstances, as far as this may be attainable.”103
But why did Senator Morgan not entertain the possibility of a
constitutional amendment for the sake of posterity, and not just a joint rule
for the next election? His failure to do so showed a lack of statesmanship.
96. Id. at 3653. Of course, the fact that a Republican—“His Fraudulency Hayes” no
less—was in the White House at the time would have created a strong incentive for the
Democrats in Congress to use the joint rule, rather than legislation, approach to adopt their
preferred procedures for counting Electoral College votes.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. In regard to that joint resolution, Senator Morgan noted that the prevailing
opinion was that the motivation to disenfranchise and punish certain southern states caused
Congress to abuse its power. Id. For an explanation of the Twenty-second joint rule, see
supra n. 37. Furthermore, Senator Morgan noted that Congress had adopted twenty-two
such joint rules but never submitted one to the President. 10 CONG. REC. at 3663. Indeed, he
noted, the question of presentment to the President was expressly raised and decided in the
negative when the first joint rule was adopted. Id.
100. Id. at 3654. Indeed, Lincoln actually held on to the resolution until the votes had
been counted in favor of his election and then signed it. Id. Senator Morgan’s concern
makes sense; as he later noted, there should be “great deal of hesitancy, and I confess in
some instances with alarm, upon intrusting [sic] to the President of the United States the
power to participate in legislation which might affect the result of the count in which he was
personally interested.” Id. at 3659 Likewise, if Congress desired to change the law, the
president could veto the measure if he decided it was not in his interest or simply disagreed
with it. Id.
101. Id. at 3654.
102. Id. Senator Roscoe Conkling (R, NY) argued that the rule should have a provision
requiring that it could not be withdrawn except by concurrent vetoes of both houses,
otherwise it would have no permanence in the event of political shifts in Congress. Id. at
3661.
103. Id. at 3654.
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Like the Democrats in 1804, who asserted their unilateral power to adopt
the Twelfth Amendment over the objections of the Federalist Party, 104 the
Democrats of 1880 could have pushed forward their vision of how to
resolve a disputed presidential election, or sought some form of
accommodation with Republicans in order to assure necessary ratification
of an amendment.
Senator Morgan argued that the joint session certainly had the power to
determine whether the “power of appointment has been constitutionally and
lawfully exercised,” but in the event that a state only returned one
certificate, the requirement that both Houses concur in order to reject the
certificate embraced the idea that they should presume that the certificate
received was legitimate.105 The same presumption did not apply when a
state submitted multiple certificates.106
Senator Morgan’s critiques of using a traditional piece of legislation to
regulate the electoral count and compelling the states to create procedures
that would give their returns a presumption of validity were leveled directly
at Senate Bill 1485, introduced by Senator Edmunds.107 This Bill was in
fact the precursor to the Electoral Count Act. For instance, it gave
presumptive approval to any determination of an election controversy made
pursuant to the preexisting laws of a state.108 Senator Edmunds’ Bill
required only one Senator and House member to sign each objection to an
electoral vote.109 Upon receiving the objections for a specific state, each
House was to withdraw and consider the objections.110
The proposed Bill also had particular rules that restricted the discretion of
the two Houses to reject votes. For instance, if only one set of returns was
received from a state, rejection of those returns required the affirmative
votes of both Houses.111 In the case of two or more sets of votes, only
those votes found to be “regularly given by the electors” determined by the
appropriate tribunal under preexisting state law could be counted.112 In the
104. See infra note 121.
105. 10 Cong. Rec. at 3655 (“The theory of the rule now presented is that the States first
pass judgment upon the fact of the appointment of electors and upon the validity of the votes
cast by them so far, at least, as the question of their validity depends upon the laws of the
States; and unless the Houses shall concur in overruling that decision, it shall stand.”).
106. Id.
107. For the full text of the bill, see id. at 3656-57.
108. Id. at 3656.
That each State may, pursuant to its laws existing on the day fixed for the
appointment of the electors, try and determine before the time fixed for the
meeting of the electors any controversy concerning their appointment, or the
appointment of any of them. Every such determination made pursuant to such law
so existing on said day, and made prior to the said time of meeting of the electors,
shall be conclusive evidence of the lawful title of the electors who shall have been
so determined to have been appointed, and shall govern in the counting of the
electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated.
Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. This is the same as Senator Morgan’s joint rule.
112. Id.
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case of a dispute of more than one state tribunal, the two Houses would
have to concur as to which electors and tribunal were “authorized by [the
state’s] laws.”113 If no state tribunal was to pass judgment on multiple
slates of electors then the two Houses would have to concurrently decide
“the lawful votes of the legally appointed electors of such State.”114
Ultimately, Senator Edmunds maintained that his Bill restricted the ability
of the joint session to pass judgment upon a state’s selection of electors in a
way that was most faithful to the Constitution.115
Senator Morgan was quick to note that the two proposals contained many
similarities. In addition to objecting to the use of a bill, his primary critique
was leveled at giving presumptive validity to a decision by a state’s highest
tribunal. Senator Morgan argued that this provision impermissibly
restricted the constitutional power of the two Houses to judge the votes of a
state.116 As Senator Morgan noted, the joint session, which he called the
election tribunal, was a peculiar body in the Constitution:
It is not a congress met together; it is not a joint assemblage of the two
Houses in which there is any general power to be exercised by them in the
presence of each other, but it is the meeting of two distinct constitutional
bodies entrusted with a distinct constitutional jurisdiction. The very
essence of the jurisdiction that they can exercise implies necessarily that
they must have the full and unlimited power of deciding according to their
own enlightened discretion and judgment as to what is proper to be done
under the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . .117

Furthermore, he argued, if Senator Edmunds was correct and the two
Houses could be required to accept the final judgment of a state on this
matter, it is because the Constitution must entrust that power to the
states.118 Instead, Senator Edmunds’ proposal would allow the power to be
impermissibly shared between the states and the two Houses of
Congress.119
Senator Edmunds responded to Senator Morgan’s assertion that the use
of traditional legislation was inappropriate by noting that as early as 1800,
when Congress considered creating a Grand Committee120 for counting
electoral votes, both Houses passed legislation in support of the proposal.121
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 3697 (“I have always maintained since I have maintained anything about it,
that the Congress of the United States has not a right in any form to draw into question the
action of a State, and that when the counting power, be it large or little, or wherever it may
be . . . has ascertained that those are the official papers of the State, comes to act it has no
mission of decision or discretion or consideration at all; that its duty is absolutely
ministerial.”).
116. Id. at 3658–59.
117. Id. at 3659.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. The Grand Committee proposal of 1800 would have appointed six members of each
House of Congress and the Chief Justice to resolve election disputes. See generally, Colvin
& Foley, supra note 3, at 486–88.
121. 10 CONG. REC. at 3662 (also noting an attempt to do the same in 1824).
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The source of power to legislate in the area, according to Senator Edmunds,
came from the Necessary and Proper Clause.122 Furthermore, a traditional
piece of legislation was desirable because it was permanent in nature and
less vulnerable to abuse in the event of one-party control of Congress.123
Senator Morgan responded by noting that neither Bill in 1800was adopted
by both Houses. He also criticized the specificity that Senator Edmunds’
Bill included, which, he argued, would tend to cause Congress to legislate
with more and more detail on the subject.124 Of course in the background
of this debate must have been the fact that the President was a Republican.
The Democrats could pass a joint rule without Republican support or the
President’s signature. A piece of legislation would require some level of
compromise in order to gain President Hayes’ signature.
The Senate again took up debate of Senator Morgan’s concurrent
resolution ten days later on May 24, 1880.125 Senator Henry M. Teller (R,
CO), who was also on the Committee, started the debate by voicing his
objections to the plan.126 Senator Teller began by acknowledging that the
Senate might be “acting under a pressing necessity, [and] under a demand
made by the people for some provision for counting the electoral vote” but
this Bill was a purely temporary measure, likely to survive only one
electoral count.127
Worse still, Senator Teller saw no reason either House could abandon the
rule either before or during the electoral count.128 Senator Teller also
objected that the resolution gave Congress too much power, authorizing the
two Houses “to inquire whether the electors had been or had not been
elected in the manner provided by the various State Legislatures.”129 But
122. Id. at 3694.
123. Id. at 3695. By contrast, a joint rule, “instead of providing . . . for a rule of law
which certainly exercises some constraint upon Senators and members of Congress as well
as other people, [Senator Morgan] propose[s] to decline to have a law at all, but propose[s]
to leave it to the entirely unregulated, unbridled, and undirected will of what may happen to
be the majority on that occasion, and in the case of a double return to say that you will take
neither unless both Houses can agree to take one or the other. That would have the effect to
throw out the vote of the particular State on this division.” Id.
124. Id. at 3662 (“Once that you get this subject open to legislative action and put it under
the control of the legislative power of Congress you open a wide gap . . . .”).
125. Id. at 3682.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 3683. Senator Henry M. Teller was an absolutist on this question. (“The
Constitution . . . submitted this whole question to the State, having reserved nothing to
Congress except the power to appoint the time at which these men should be appointed and
the time at which they should cast their votes, the authority, it seems to me, to examine and
determine whether the State has elected them in the manner that we think they ought to have
been elected cannot be found anywhere in the Constitution.”). Id. Senator Teller went so far
as to insist that Congress could not even pass judgment on whether an elector was
constitutionally ineligible. Id. Despite this, Senator Teller did seem to leave open the idea
that Congress could pass judgment on the actions of state officials if they acted outside “the
ordinary forms of law.” Id. Furthermore, seemingly contradicting himself, Senator Teller
thought it possible that Congress could pass a law to this effect. Id. It is difficult to
understand how this might solve the constitutional problems posed by passing judgment on
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what if a state submits multiple returns? In that case Senator Teller’s
absolutist position unraveled, and he acknowledged that the two Houses
could determine the “one true return.”130 Senator Teller did not explain
how the two Houses would venture to determine the honest return.
Senator John J. Ingalls (R, KS) rose to explain the sorts of “emergencies”
that could arise during the electoral count: (1) a certificate might be
withheld or defective, (2) one or more electors might be constitutionally
ineligible, (3) the electors might cast their votes for ineligible candidates,
(4) a state might not be eligible to cast votes, (5) there might be multiple
returns from a single state, and (6) no person might receive a majority of the
votes.131 Despite all of these problems, Senator Ingalls noted that the
Constitution only provided a solution for the sixth issue, no candidate
receiving a majority of the votes.132 In this case, of course, the vote would
be shifted to the House of Representatives, where the representation from
each state would have a single vote.133 Senator Ingalls maintained that by
analogy, this method was the only method the Constitution provided to
resolve these sorts of emergencies and should be employed in the five other
emergencies.134 Senator Ingalls offered an amendment to the joint rule to
this effect.135
Senators Edmunds and Morgan again debated the virtues of enacting a
statute or joint rule.136 Senator Morgan suggested the statute would be no
more compulsory than a rule and that there would be no way to force

the electoral votes, unless perhaps he thought it would be authorized by the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
130. Id. Ultimately, Senator Teller’s absolutist stance only applied if there was a single
return. Id. Senator Teller’s argument would have been stronger if he explained why
Congress could pick between two returns but not disqualify a constitutionally ineligible
elector.
131. Id. at 3685.
132. Id.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
134. 10 CONG. REC. at 3685–86. Thus, if a state returned two rival certificates, the
question would be turned over to the House voting by state representation. Senator John J.
Ingalls maintained that this was most faithful to the Constitution in two ways. First, the
Framers envisioned the method to resolve one of the types of emergencies. Id. Second, this
method looked the most like the Electoral College itself, so it would remain faithful to that
institution and the rights of the states. Id. The Senate, he argued, would play no role in the
matter. Id. at 3686.
135. Id. at 3686. Senator Ingalls also stressed that he voted against the electoral
commission bill in 1877 and was of the opinion that constitutional amendment was the only
appropriate method for changing the operation of electoral count. Id. at 3685 (“It appears
inappropriate that a President should have any connection whatever with legislation bearing
upon a subject so vital and important to himself. It should be, in my judgment, by an
amendment to the Constitution.”). However, if a statute should be passed, Senator Ingalls
argued that they should act quickly before the politics of the next election affected their
ability to do so in a nonpartisan fashion. Id. Senator Ingalls’ argument was opposed most
strongly by Senator Conkling, despite the fact that he did not plan to vote for the rule. Id. at
3686–87. Senator Conkling’s opposition was grounded in his belief that partisan bias would
govern results in a close election with one-party control of Congress. Id. at 3689. Finding no
support, Senator Ingalls withdrew the amendment. Id. at 3694.
136. Id. at 3699–700.
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Congress to abide by it if Congress chose to ignore it.137 Senator Edmunds
replied that he felt the political ramifications of ignoring the statute were
too great, for instance, if the statute plainly required the joint session to
accept any decision made by a state tribunal about the correct electors, the
joint session would feel compelled to do so.138
Ultimately, Senator Edmunds offered an amendment substituting Senator
Morgan’s resolution with his proposal.139 The amendment was rejected
thirteen to twenty-seven.140 Senator Edmunds then offered an amendment
to Senator Morgan’s resolution that gave conclusive status to any
determination about an election dispute made by a state tribunal pursuant to
laws existing prior to the meeting of the electors.141 This amendment was
rejected fourteen to twenty-five.142 The Senate considered Senator
Morgan’s resolution without any amendments and the resolution passed
twenty-five to fourteen.143
2. The House Considers the Joint Rule
The House took up consideration of the resolution on June 10, 1880.144
The Chairman of the Committee on the Electoral Count, Representative
George A. Bicknell (D, IN) introduced the Bill, noting that the whole
committee had considered and agreed upon the resolution.145
Representative Bicknell started by stating that the Necessary and Proper
Clause empowered Congress to “provide legislation necessary and proper to
carry into effect the powers of the two Houses for ascertaining and
declaring the result of the election.”146 Representative Bicknell did
acknowledge what he considered to be the weakness of the resolution, its
form as a joint rule rather than legislation.147 In his mind, the Constitution
demanded legislation to carry into execution constitutional provisions and
thus, a joint rule is nothing more than “mere make-shift, a temporary
expedient” because “it binds nobody.”148 Bicknell was unclear about the
reason the Senate insisted on a joint rule, but he had several ideas. First, he
suggested that it might be revenge for the Republican use of the Twenty-

137. Id. at 3699.
138. Id. at 3700.
139. Id. at 3701.
140. Id. at 3703. Thirty-six senators were absent. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 3704.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 4386.
145. Id. There was no formal written report and motions to refer the bill back to the
committee to produce a report were rejected. Id. at 4387.
146. Id. at 4387. Additionally, he noted, the current state of the law was inadequate. Id.
(“[The statutes] fail to declare who shall count the electoral vote, they fail to declare who
shall determine what are votes proper to be counted, and they make no provision whatever
for the determination of contested elections.”).
147. Id. at 4388.
148. Id. (“Either House adopting it to-day may abandon it to-morrow. It carries no moral
force with it.”).

2010]

LESSON FROM THE HAYES-TILDEN DISPUTE

1069

Representative Bicknell responded to this
Second Joint Rule.149
suggestion, “I submit that it is not our part to follow republican examples;
we never gained anything by it. Our business is to do right and satisfy our
constituents.”150 Representative John Van Voorhis (R, NY) was even
sharper in his attribution of partisanship, describing the joint rule as “a
convenient and easy method to enable the Democratic Party to obtain the
Presidency, whether its candidate is elected or not.”151
The other possible reason why the Democrats in the Senate insisted on a
joint rule was simply that passing a traditional bill was impossible. But
Representative Bicknell argued that this should not be a deterrent either.152
Despite his concerns, Representative Bicknell gave his support to the joint
rule because it addressed the “emergency”153 and might give momentum to
an eventual piece of legislation.154
The objections to the rule were generally similar to those in the Senate.
For instance, Representative Thomas Updegraff (R, IA) voiced several
objections. First, he believed that the power to count rested with the
President of the Senate and could only be altered by constitutional
amendment.155 Second, the joint rule violated Article 2, Section 1 of the
Constitution, giving state legislatures the power to appoint the electors.156
And third, the passage of the rule would only make matters and confusion

149. Id. Indeed, Representative Eppa Hunton (D, VA) argued that the Republicans were
hypocritical for opposing this rule on the grounds that they approved of the Twenty-Second
Joint Rule. Id. at 4494 (“Now, what do my friends on the other side think of this rule in
regard to violating State rights if their party approved the late twenty-second joint rule?”).
Representative Harry White (R, PA) responded by simply saying it “was a bad rule.” Id.
150. Id. at 4388.
151. Id. at 4487.
152. Id. at 4388 (“The answer to this is that, if we are right, the possibility of defeat ought
not deter us, the difficulties in the way ought not to frighten us. If it be suggested that some
constitutional scruples may defeat the proposed law, I submit that a joint rule contravening
the Constitution is no better, nay, it is worse than a doubtful law; it is accomplishing by
indirection what you dare not openly undertake. If it be suggested that there is danger of a
veto from the President, the answer is, we are bound to perform our duty without reference
to a possible failure of duty elsewhere.”).
153. Id. Representative George A. Bicknell also referred to the defects of the Twelfth
Amendment. See id. for his take on the various opinions of the Twelfth Amendment.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 4389; see also id. at 4501–02 (argument by Representative Lucien B. Caswell
(R, WI) that this rule and the electoral commission bill were unconstitutional). Other
Republicans stuck with the argument that legislation was necessary. For example,
Representative White maintained that there was no doubt that Congress could legislate on
the matter, pointing to the Electoral Commission and participation by five Supreme Court
justices as the highest precedent in this regard. Id. at 4500.
156. Id. at 4389. Additionally, Representative Thomas Updegraff maintained that the
constitutional text and structure gave no suggestion that Congress should have any power to
legislate in the area of the electoral count; rather, all such power was granted to the states. Id.
at 4390. The fact that under the proposed joint rule a single House could stifle the voice of a
state caused issue as well. Id. at 4391. Representative John Van Voorhis (R, NY) was
generally of the same opinion. He believed that all disputes and questions could only be
answered and settled at the state level. If two certificates were received, then it was up to the
President of the Senate, and only the President of the Senate, to look to see which certificate
was made in the mode prescribed by the state legislature. Id. at 4488.
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worse.157 Additionally, Representative Updegraff argued that the power
created by the resolution was “unmistakably judicial and not legislative”
and it was wrong to assign such power to a legislative body.158 Another
objection, from Representative Van Voorhis, was that allowing Congress to
play an active role in the electoral count would violate separation of powers
because it would take power from the President of the Senate (the Vice
President) and give Congress too much power in determining who will be
the next President.159
Representative William Lounsbery (D, NY) made appeals to the urgency
of the matter. It was only the following winter of 1881 during which the
joint session would count the electoral votes. If they did not pass a
resolution, there would be no rule by which to guide the count and the
country might fall again to political division.160 Representative Harry
White (R, PA) doubted the sincerity of the Democrats’ sense of urgency.
He argued that it was not without reason that they only pursued this joint
rule at the very end of the session, suggesting that the Democrats sought to
sneak one by the other party or the American people.161 Indeed, he pointed
out, there had been ample opportunity for the House to deal with the issue
since 1876 but there seemed to be no sense of urgency then.162
Representative Eppa Hunton (VA, D) took issue with the idea that this
rule was an invasion upon the power of the states to appoint the electors.
Representative Hunton argued that first, the right to select electors is not an
original power, but rather one conferred upon the states by the
Constitution.163 This right, however, was not absolute, because it was not
an interest in each state individually, but all the states together.164 In other
157. Id. at 4389.
158. Id. at 4393.
159. Id. at 4490–91.
160. Id. at 4401 (“[T]he two Houses of Congress will come together next winter, as the
Constitution says they shall come, without any light or guide except their conscience and
their purpose at the time when they have to act[.] Do they not know that when great interests
are at stake, when two, three, or perhaps more parties in this country shall have been in a
struggle hot and exciting, the blood not yet cooled, the results not yet determined, the dispute
still active in the public minds in all the States—do not gentlemen know the great danger
which will hang over us if we now refuse to act?”). Similar appeals were made by
Representative Hunton. Id. at 4492 (“The question presented to this House is one of the
deepest importance, because in my opinion if ever this country is disrupted and the
Government broken up it will be on the occasion of a contested presidential election.”); id. at
4494. (“[T]he closing hours of this session are approaching, and we thought something must
be done to avert the disaster, possibly war, next year, in the count of the votes for
President . . . .”).
161. Id. at 4491 (“The American people are now within five months of another
presidential election, with the possibilities of all the angry excitements of the past upon
them, and yet no deliberate enactments have been considered by this House nor by this
Congress providing suitable remedies against the dangerous perils from the uncertainties and
disputes about electoral counts. Now, here in the closing hours of the session a remedy, a
weak, unsatisfactory, unconstitutional remedy, is proposed in the form of a mere legislative
rule.”).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 4492.
164. Id.
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words, in 1876, “[n]ot only was Louisiana interested to have her true vote
counted and to have her legally appointed electors certify their votes here
and their votes counted, but every one of the thirty-eight States . . . had the
same interest in the question.”165 Debate over the resolution continued until
June 14, at which point the Democrats were unable to form a quorum in
order to vote to pass the resolution.166 Having reached the end of the
session, Representative Bicknell relented and made a motion that the
resolution be postponed until December.167
3. The Senate Revisits the Question in December 1880 and Amends the
Plan
The presidential election in November 1880, between Republican James
Garfield and Democrat Winfield S. Hancock, was remarkably close, with
the closest popular vote margin ever, less than 10,000 votes, or less than 0.1
percent of the total.168 The electoral vote margin was 214–155, but
Garfield won the 35 electoral votes in New York by a relatively close
margin, 20,000 votes out of 1.1 million votes cast, enough to swing the
entire election.169 Had Hancock won New York, he would have had an
Electoral College majority of 190–179.
The Democrats alleged fraud in the state, with suggestions that
Republicans had brought in voters from neighboring states and that 5,000
Democratic ballots were dumped into the Hudson River.170 Some
Democratic leaders argued that Hancock should contest the election; he
waited six days to concede, deciding it was not worth the possible unrest.171
Republicans had allegations of their own, including fraud in California and
“fraud, violence and intimidation” in parts of the South in states that went
for Hancock.172 Despite the closeness of the election, however, it does not
appear from the debates that it played much of a role in cajoling Congress
to act.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 4540. House Republicans were refusing to vote. Id.
167. Id. The motion passed ninety to seventy-five. Id. at 4541. In the Senate, Senator
Morgan offered a resolution to note that “the President of the Senate is not invested by the
Constitution of the United States with the right to count the votes of electors” in response to
the House’s inability to consider the joint rule. Id. at 4558. The resolution could not be
considered without unanimous consent and Senator Ingalls. Id.
168. KENNETH D. ACKERMAN, DARK HORSE: THE SURPRISE ELECTION AND POLITICAL
MURDER OF PRESIDENT JAMES A. GARFIELD 220 (2003).
169. Id. at 221.
170. HERBERT J. CLANCY, THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1880, at 243–44 (1958).
171. EDWARD B. FOLEY, BOOK ON DISPUTED ELECTIONS (forthcoming, draft on file).
172. ACKERMAN, supra note 168, at 221. Garfield lost California by less than 150 votes
out of more than 160,000 cast. His loss was blamed on the publishing of a fake letter,
attributed to him, which suggested supported continued Chinese immigration, which was
detrimental to California workers. Id. at 218, 221. If New York had flipped to Winfield S.
Hancock, Garfield would have only needed to flip a state with six electoral votes to regain
the lead, the number that California had that year. In fact, California was so close that year
that one of Garfield’s electors actually polled higher than one of Hancock’s, causing
California to split its Electoral College vote 5–1. See JEROME D. LEVIN, PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS, 1789–2000, at 158 (2002).
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On December 22, Senator Morgan reintroduced the resolution to have the
Senate vote on it or to have it referred back to the committee.173 Senators
Morgan and Edmunds proceeded to rehash much of their debate from the
past summer.174 The only portion perhaps worth mentioning is that Senator
Edmunds insisted that at this point there was no real urgency on the matter
because it was his belief that James Garfield was duly elected President and
there would be no issues during the electoral count.175 Senator Morgan
responded that a regulation for the conduct of the count was still needed and
that there might be some question about the vote of Georgia.176 Georgia’s
electors cast their votes on the incorrect day. Regardless, Senator Edmunds
moved that the Senate proceed to the consideration of other business and
the Senate agreed to the motion.177
On January 29, 1881, Senator Ingalls introduced a resolution requesting
the presences of both Houses for the purpose of counting the electoral vote.
The resolution was similar in form to the typical electoral count resolution,
providing for a date and time and purpose for the meeting, with little
guidance as far as procedure.178 Senator Thomas F. Bayard (D, DE) made a
motion to refer the resolution to the Select Committee on the Electoral
Count.179 The Republicans argued that this was unnecessary since the
resolution was the same in form to most prior resolutions and there were
only eight legislative days until the joint session, so it was unlikely anything
more specific could be agreed on.180 Senator Morgan argued that he did not
desire to have the joint session and to see a dispute arise without a rule
established in advance of the dispute, again referring to a possible issue
with the state of Georgia.181 Once again, even over this relatively simple
issue, the debate broke along partisan lines and the resolution was referred
to the committee twenty-nine to eighteen.182
Senator Morgan reported back to the full Senate with the resolution and
an amendment on February 1.183 The amendment added a section to deal
with any potential votes of electors that “have been given on a day other
than that fixed for casting such votes by act of Congress.”184 This took the
form of a few prior joint rules in the event that the vote count would be
stated in two hypothetical totals: if the votes had counted, or if they had
173. 11 CONG. REC. 312 (1880).
174. Id. at 312–17.
175. Id. at 317.
176. Id. If Hancock had won New York, and Georgia’s votes had been thrown out, there
would have been a question whether Hancock had won “a majority of the whole number of
electors appointed,” as required by the Twelfth Amendment.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1020–21.
179. Id. at 1021.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1022 (“It is therefore proper, it seems to me, that this committee should take
into consideration at least . . . [the] questions that may arise in reference to the counting of
the votes of the different States.”).
182. Id. at 1023.
183. Id. at 1090.
184. Id.
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not.185 Senator Morgan admitted that James Garfield had won the
Presidency and expressed his confidence that the electoral count would be
orderly and peaceful.186 As such, he felt it was necessary to adopt this
solution in order to avoid any issue about Georgia’s vote.187
Senator Edmunds, Senator Morgan’s antagonist much of the previous
session, agreed with the approach.188 Despite that, there was still some
opposition. Senator George F. Hoar (R, MA)189, recognizing that Congress
had adopted this approach in the past, expressed his concern that this was
the equivalent to failing in their constitutional duty, that there would in fact
be no single electoral count.190 Senator Benjamin Harvey Hill, from
Georgia attributed his state’s failure to cast the votes on the correct day to a
mere accident, a misunderstanding as to which day would be the first
Wednesday in December.191 Despite this, and the fact that he was certain
that the votes still reflected the election in Georgia, Senator Hill argued that
the votes should be excluded on the grounds that this was what the
Constitution and statute required and to send a message to states so they
know the rule will be enforced.192
The House considered the Senate’s joint resolution on February 5 and the
debate included basically the same points as those made in the Senate.
Despite these strong opinions, the resolution passed the House, 160–77.193
185. Id.
Were the votes of electors cast on the ___ day of ___, 1880, to be counted, the
result would be A B for President of the United States ___ votes, and for C D for
President of the United States ___ votes; if not counted the result would be for A B
for President of the United States ___ votes, and for C D for President of the
United States ___ votes, but in either event ___ is elected President of the United
States.
186. Id. at 1130.
187. Id.
188. Id. (“I have no disposition to discuss or criticise the second part of the amendment
recommended by the committee, in respect of, as it is understood, the State of Georgia.”).
Likewise, Senator Ingalls, who opposed Senator Morgan’s efforts to create a joint rule,
agreed with the approach. Id. at 1133.
189. As will be seen, along with Senator Edmunds, Senator George F. Hoar, Republican
from Massachusetts, was one of the main advocates of the ECA in the Senate. He was
Chairman of the Committee on Privileges and Elections for more than ten years during this
period. 2 GEORGE F. HOAR, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARS 100 (1903). Remarkably,
neither his autobiography nor biography contains a single mention of the bill. Id.; see also
FREDERICK H. GILLETT, GEORGE FRISBIE HOAR (1934).
190. 11 CONG. REC. at 1131:
I deemed it my duty to put on record my protest and my conviction that the
Congress of the United States has got over the temporary danger and temporary
difficulty, not in a constitutional way, by providing by law as it ought to have done
at the time of the last election, a method of performing this constitutional function
of counting the vote, but by refusing to perform the one clearest and most
imperative duty which rests upon somebody, under the Constitution, to count the
vote.
191. Id. at 1133.
192. Id. at 1133–34 (“[T]he States ought all to be notified that if they fail to cast their vote
in the manner, and especially at the time, prescribed by the law of Congress, the vote will not
be counted . . . .”).
193. Id. at 1262. Democrats voted in favor of the resolution, 115-6. Thirty-five
Republicans voted for it while sixty-seven voted against it.
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The electoral vote count was performed according to the resolution on
February 9, declaring the results in two alternatives, with and without
Georgia’s electoral votes.194
Thus, the country and Congress barely dodged another bullet in 1880.
Even so, this fact coupled with the still-recent experience of the election of
1876 was insufficient to prompt Congress into statesman-like behavior in
preparation for the next presidential election.
C. Forty-Seventh Congress 1881–1883: A Virtual Tie in the Senate and
Republican Majority in the House of Representatives
In the 47th Congress, the Senate again considered the Edmunds Bill. The
debate was short and the Bill passed without issue. The story was different
in the House of Representatives where the bill failed by a vote of 93 for and
100 against.195 The later debates had more depth so they are examined in
more detail; it is noteworthy, however, that the Republican House rejected a
plan that had been chiefly designed by Republicans in the Senate. 196
D. Forty-Eighth Congress 1883–1885: The Democrats Control the House
of Representatives and the Republicans Control the Senate
The 48th Congress marked a shift in control, with Democrats clearly
controlling the House of Representatives and Republicans controlling the
Senate. This appears to have shifted the debate over the electoral count as
well, as the Senate actively proposed legislation, instead of joint rule, over
the course of the next few years. The debate also shifted to protecting the
institutional prerogatives of the two Houses, rather than the political power
of the two parties. Once again, another exceedingly close presidential
election was on the horizon in 1884, but that did not motivate the two
parties to adopt a bipartisan compromise that would handle a potential
dispute impartially.
1. Congress Considers the Edmunds Bill
Senator Hoar re-introduced the Edmunds Bill, Senate Bill 25, on
December 4, 1883.197 The Senate began consideration on January 16, 1884
and Senator Hoar noted that the bill had the unanimous support of the
Committee on Privileges and Elections and was the same as the bill that
passed the Senate two winters before.198 The Bill, which had breezed
through the tied Senate in the previous session, did the same in the
Republican-controlled Senate without amendment or debate on January 16,
1884.199
194. Id. at 1372.
195. 13 CONG. REC. 5149 (1882).
196. The House Democrats voted eighty-three for and zero against the bill. The House
Republicans voted five for and ninety-seven against the measure.
197. 15 CONG. REC. 12 (1883).
198. Id. at 430.
199. Id.
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The Bill was referred to the Select Committee on the Law Respecting
Election of President and Vice-President in the House on January 24.200
The Committee came back with a report on April 10 and the Bill was
placed on the House Calendar for debate.201 The House Committee
amended the Senate Bill and Representative William W. Eaton (D, CT)
presented the changes.202 The proposed changes were significant. First,
they eliminated the conclusive status given to electoral certificates produced
as a result of a state’s election dispute mechanisms.203 Second, the
amendment eliminated any attempts to bind the joint session into a
particular decision governed by the circumstances and to prevent the joint
session from rejecting votes.204 Instead, the amendment only sought to
outline the procedures for dealing with the objections to a state’s electoral
votes or double returns. In the case of either, the resolution was submitted
to the entire joint session.205 The joint session would engage in three hours
of debate and then proceed to vote per capita by state to determine the
resolution of the matter.206
The House debated the new Bill over four days. The arguments for and
against the Senate Bill were not unlike the arguments advanced in prior
sessions.207 For instance, Representative Alphonso Hart (R, OH) argued
against the House amendment because it did not bind the joint session to
particular outcomes; the outcome of any dispute would likely be determined
by which party comprised the majority in the per capita voting.208
Representative Abraham X. Parker (R, NY) noted that the House
Democrats were knowingly awarding themselves an advantage with this
plan because they would have a strong overall majority in a joint session,
suggesting partisan motivations were still at play despite the split
congressional power.209
Likewise, arguments were made in favor of the amendment. For
instance, Representative Luke Pryor (D, AL), a member of the committee,
argued that the House amendment was based on a faithful interpretation of
the Constitution, which empowered the joint session, as a unique body, to
resolve questions about the electoral vote.210 Still, House members
200. Id. at 638.
201. Id. at 2843.
202. Id. at 5076.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 5076–80, 5096–105, 5453–68, 5545–51.
208. Id. at 5454. Representative Alphonso Hart also noted the criticism that the Electoral
Commission received, even though, he argued, it was made up of some of the most
distinguished jurists of the day. If they were viewed in such a light, a partisan vote from the
entire Congress would be worse. Id.
209. Id. at 5460 (noting the Democrats had a seventy-seven vote majority there).
210. Id. at 5096–105
Having reached the conclusion that this board have been assembled under the
provisions of the Constitution for a purpose that involves and implies action . . . I
repeat and now insist that in this word vote is included the ascertainment and
determination of all defects, irregularities, illegalities, non-qualifications of
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recognized the urgency and timeliness of resolving the issue at that time.
For instance, Republican Representative Hilary A. Herbert (D, AL) noted
that it was time for Congress to pass a law given the impending presidential
campaign and the fact that the Congress was split between the two
parties.211
Just before voting on the committee’s amendment, the House considered
an amendment in the event the underlying amendment failed. That
amendment would have eliminated the word “conclusive” regarding a
determination of an election dispute by the state, instead allowing it to be
overruled by concurrent action of both Houses acting separately.212 The
House voted on the amendment on June 24 and there were 127 yeas and
eighty-two neas, with 114 not voting, so the amendment passed.213 With so
many members not voting, it is difficult to determine whether it was a strict
partisan vote, although all 116 Republicans voting in unison would not have
defeated the yeas. Senate Bill 25 was sent back to the Senate in its
amended form and referred back to the Committee on Privileges and
Elections.214 Senator Hoar had the Bill discharged from the committee and
was granted unanimous consent for the Senate to non-concur to the changes
and seek a conference.215 On June 28, the House agreed to a conference.216
However, Senator Hoar reported back to the Senate that the conference was
unable to agree on the question on February 13, 1885.217
2. The 1884 Presidential Election
None of the sources reveal why the two parties were unable to agree.
One thing did happen in the interim: the 1884 presidential election. A
possibility is that the uncertainty of the outcome of the election, rather than
galvanizing the conference to agree, made one party or the other wait to see
if it might gain the Presidency and an upper hand on the issue later. The
situation was similar to that in 1876 insofar as Republicans controlled both
the White House and the Senate going into the election. They might have

electors or persons voted for, frauds . . . or coercions, from the suffragan through
its transit to this Federal board of inspectors, revisers, and determinants of last
resort at the seat of the Government of the United States.
211. Id. at 5546 (“We are entering on what is likely to be a very exciting Presidential
campaign. The House is Democratic and the Senate is Republican, and if we adjourn this
session without having agreed upon any rule or any law which shall regulate the count of the
electoral vote we may have a deadlock again next winter . . . I believe that a bad law would
be better than no law at all.”).
212. Id. at 5550. Two other amendments were considered. One was notable because it
submitted disputes to the Supreme Court, rather than Congress. That amendment was not
approved. Id.
213. Id. at 5551. The Democrats voted 122-17 for the amendment. One Republican
joined them, with sixty-three voting against it.
214. Id. at 5579.
215. Id. at 5689. The Senators appointed to the conference were Senators Hoar, John
Sherman (R, OH) and James L. Pugh (AL). Id.
216. 15 CONG. REC. at 5762. The House appointed Representatives William W. Eaton,
Risden T. Bennett (D, NC), and Hart to the conference.
217. 16 CONG. REC. 1618 (1884).
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thought that by controlling the Presiding Officer in the Senate as well as the
military, they would have the upper hand if the situation of 1876 repeated
itself. Conversely, the Democrats might have thought they could use their
control of the House to prevail this time, even if they had not done so in
1877.
As in 1880, New York would be the “swing state” of the election. An
assassin’s bullet struck down President Garfield in September 1881,
allowing his running mate Chester A. Arthur, a New Yorker, to assume the
Presidency. In 1882, President Arthur inserted himself in his home state’s
politics by ensuring that his Secretary of the Treasury, Charles J. Folger,
replaced the incumbent Governor as the Republican nominee for that
office.218 The resulting bitterness helped the Democrat’s nominee, Stephen
Grover Cleveland, to victory as Governor of New York.219 Just two years
later, with the support of the Tilden political machine, Cleveland emerged
as the Democrats’ nominee for the Presidency of the United States.220 This
marked the third New Yorker to capture the nomination in the last four
elections.221
With the sitting governor of the likely swing-state taking the nomination,
it is difficult to say how this might have played into the considerations of
Democrats and Republicans in Congress. The Democrats were likely more
confident of their success and Cleveland’s ability to secure New York.
Likewise, the Republicans, aware of the possibility of fraud with the 1880
elections in mind, might have been more interested in having the ability to
challenge New York’s returns, which would have been limited by the
legislation under consideration. President Arthur did not pursue the
Republican nomination aggressively, perhaps due to contracting Bright’s
disease,222 and the nomination went to former Maine Congressman and
Secretary of State James G. Blaine.223
The national election was quite close, with a slim popular vote margin,
48.5% to 48.2% and 219 electoral votes to 182, both in favor of
Cleveland.224 New York, the swing state, was even closer in 1884 than
1880: just less than 1100 votes, instead of 20,000, meaning a swing of just
550 could have shifted the presidency to Blaine.225 With such a close
margin, it took two weeks to resolve the outcome in New York and both
parties enlisted the assistance of lawyers to review the official canvassing of

218. RICHARD E. WELCH, JR., THE PRESIDENCIES OF GROVER CLEVELAND 25 (1988).
219. Id. at 26. Grover Cleveland was a relative political novice at the time; he had served
as Sheriff of Erie County from 1871–1873 and was Mayor of Buffalo for only a few months
before receiving the nomination for Governor. Id. at 24–25.
220. Id. at 28–29. The support of Tilden came after there was some movement for a
Tilden nomination in order to “revenge the ‘Steal of ‘76.’” Id.
221. Id. at 29.
222. THOMAS C. REEVES, GENTLEMAN BOSS: THE LIFE OF CHESTER ALAN ARTHUR 317
(1975). Indeed, Chester A. Arthur died shortly after leaving office. Id. at 418.
223. Harper’s Weekly, The Presidential Elections:
1860–1912, available at
http://elections.harpweek.com/1884/Overview-1884-4.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
224. Id.
225. REEVES, supra note 222, at 40–41.
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votes in New York.226 New York’s canvassing process, structured to
include bipartisan observers, found Cleveland to be the winner and resulted
in a relatively peaceful resolution.227
Again, the irresponsibility of going into the 1884 presidential election
without a procedure is remarkable. What would have happened if New
York had devolved into an 1876-like dispute? Like in 1876, there were no
procedures for dealing with this scenario and Congress was split between
the two parties. Incredibly this close-call did not seem to raise serious
concern among the various actors in Congress.
Another factor might be crucial, however. Senator Hoar’s Bill passed
through the Senate with little objection from Senate Democrats. It could be
that the members of the two Houses thought each respective Bill went the
furthest to protect their interests. With such a wide difference between the
House stance and the Senate stance, compromise would have been quite
difficult. Still, it is the obligation of statesmen to overcome such concerns
in light of the overriding national interest, and this they failed to do.
E. Forty-Ninth Congress 1885–1887: The Republicans Control the Senate
and the Democrats Control the House of Representatives
In 1887, Congress finally passed the Edmunds Bill. For some reason,
both Houses debated the issue from closer starting points. Interestingly,
both supported the Bill and opposition to it was quite bipartisan in this
session. Perhaps the closeness of the 1884 presidential election and the
split control of Congress finally triumphed, bringing both Houses together.
1. Senate Considers the Edmunds Bill Again
The next winter, the Senate reconsidered regulating the electoral count
when Senator Edmunds introduced Senate Bill 9 in December 1885.228
Senator Hoar reported back from the Committee on Privileges and
Elections to place the Bill on the calendar without amendment.229 Debate
on the Bill began formally on January 21, 1886, beginning with a speech
from Senator John Sherman (R, OH).230 Senator Sherman was the
Edmunds Bill’s chief antagonist during this debate, which is notable
because Edmunds, Hoar, and Sherman were all prominent Republicans.231
226. FOLEY, supra note 171.
227. Id. Indeed, James G. Blaine did not wish to challenge the canvassing process in
court, finding it to be fair. DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY, JAMES G. BLAINE: A POLITICAL IDOL
OF OTHER DAYS 324 (1934).
228. 17 CONG. REC.122 (1885).
229. Id. at 242.
230. Id. at 815.
231. Sherman was Republican Conference Chairman from 1884–1885 and President Pro
Tempore of the Senate from 1885–1887. He also served as Secretary of the Treasury for
President Hayes and Secretary of State for President William McKinley. Biography of John
Sherman, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774–PRESENT,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000346 (last visited Nov. 11,
2010). The Sherman Antitrust Act is, of course, named after him. WINFIELD SCOTT KERR, I
JOHN SHEMRAN: HIS LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES, at Introduction (1908).
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Senator Sherman noted that the timing again was good for passing a bill
when Congress was free from “political bias”:
[T]he bill that has twice passed the Senate and been sent to the House,
rather with a view to gain a conference than otherwise, is now before us
again. A conference was defeated by the unwillingness of either House to
abate its ideas on this question, and it now comes before us again at the
beginning of an administration, when no party advantage can be derived
from our decision, when the Senate is clearly on one side in party politics
and the House clearly is on the other; and now, if ever, this matter ought
to be settled upon some basis of principle.232

However, Senator Sherman did not think the Bill was without flaw. He
particularly disagreed with section four, in the case of a state submitting a
single set of returns, binding the joint session to accept those returns unless
both Houses agreed to reject them.233 Senator Sherman argued that this
gave weight to the opinion of one House in a disagreement over what might
be an important matter.234 The greater flaw, according to Senator Sherman,
was in the case of two returns and no determination of any dispute by the
state. There, the fourth section provided that only the returns that “the two
Houses, acting separately, shall concurrently decide to be the lawful votes
of the legally appointed electors of such State” would be counted.235
Senator Sherman considered this section in the context of the previous
election, when the vote margin in the state of New York was only a few
thousand votes and could have flipped the electoral vote count.236 If there
was a dispute over that margin, Senator Sherman argued that this provision
would have encouraged both parties in New York to submit electoral
certificates and given the partisan split in Congress, it was likely that New
York’s vote would have been excluded altogether, by whichever House
would gain a political advantage through rejecting the votes.237 Senator
Sherman agreed that there should be “some tribunal provided to whom all
questions should be referred.”238 The President of the Senate was
undesirable as this ultimate tribunal because no individual should have such
power,239 and the Supreme Court was undesirable because they should not
Senator Sherman voted against the Electoral Commission in 1877, but considered it to be a
wise measure due to the potential for civil war. 17 CONG. REC. at 815.
232. 17 CONG. REC. at 815.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 816.
235. Id.
236. Id. Senator Sherman did not explain how the two groups of electors might have
submitted votes, but he suggested that if there was a genuine issue or question about the
validity of the results, both groups of electors would find a way to meet and cast ballots. See
id.
237. Id. Furthermore, Senator Sherman argued that allowing one House to exclude the
returns of a state was not on firm constitutional ground. Id. His point was not that Congress
did not have power to regulate the electoral count but that under the Twelfth Amendment,
the “vote[s] shall be counted” requires Congress to count some votes and not to reject votes.
See id. at 817.
238. Id.
239. Id. Although Senator Sherman thought that in the absence of legislation he might
have some power. Id.
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have to decide political questions.240 Therefore, Senator Sherman argued
that the Congress, voting as one body, was capable of making this
determination, in the event of double returns or a question about a single
return when the two Houses could not agree separately.241
The Senator submitted amendments to that effect that did not pass.242
Sherman was clear as to why he advocated this “tribunal,” over other
possible arbiters, like the President of the Senate or Supreme Court. What
is not clear is why he did not propose a bipartisan commission. While he
voted against the Electoral Commission, the vote was on constitutional
grounds; otherwise, he thought it was successful. Perhaps the key here was
that he thought his amendment was possible through legislation, whereas
another proposal could only be achieved through constitutional amendment.
It does not appear that Sherman ever proposed a constitutional amendment
on the subject.
Senator Hoar took to the Senate floor in opposition to Senator Sherman’s
plan. In some ways, Senator Hoar was sympathetic to the idea of a single
common arbiter for these sorts of disputes; he just fundamentally differed in
thinking the role was judicial.243 Indeed, he thought that the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court would ably serve in the role of common arbiter.244
But as a long supporter of the Edmunds Bill, Hoar had abandoned the hope
that Congress might divest itself of this role. His support of the Bill was
based on the failed attempts of past members of Congress and the “present
state of political and public sentiment in this country.”245 This admission,

240. Id. at 817–18 (“It would tend to bring that court into public odium or one or the other
of the two great parties.”).
241. Id. at 818. In doing so, Senator Sherman noted that the legislatures of Mexico and
France were capable of operating in such a matter and acknowledged that it was unlikely his
proposal would be well regarded in the Senate since the House outnumbered them. Id.
Senator Edmunds responded by stating that they might as well amend the bill to give the
House alone the judgment. Id. at 819. Senator William M. Evarts (R, NY) argued the same
against the amendments:
I submit that the only debate here, and that is the way it has only been urged, is
that the vote of the Senate and its protective power in the election is lost by the
count in the general ballot of the two Houses connected. I cannot but perceive that
the methods proposed by the Senator from Ohio give one opportunity to the Senate
to overcome the majority in the House by the count of the united votes of the two
bodies.
Id. at 820.
242. Id.
243. 17 CONG. REC. at 1020 (“A perfect bill, as I believe, would provide for a common
arbiter between these two bodies, which the Constitution has left to the lawmaking power,
and that has been the attempt of the statesmanship that has dealt with this subject from the
beginning of the century to the present day; but every such attempt has failed.”). This was
because the function was not legislative or political, but judicial in nature. Id. (“[J]udicial in
regard to the nature and character of the act to be performed; that is, you are to have a
tribunal which is to determine the existing fact and the existing law, in contradistinction
from determining the law or creating the facts according to his own desire . . . . It is a
function into which the wish or the desire of the person exercising it can not properly
enter.”).
244. Id.
245. Id.
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by one of the chief supporters of the Edmunds Bill and leaders in the
Senate, suggests that at this point all hope of systemic reform was lost.
Senator Morgan, now in the minority, articulated the same views as he
did in earlier debates and also argued that the Constitution was actually
sufficient in its terms.246 Senator Hoar made an amendment that required a
state’s governor to certify returns.247 After extensive debate, the Bill was
recommitted to the Committee on Privileges and Elections.248 The Bill
emerged from committee with a few amendments that went to the points
brought up by Senator William M. Evarts and passed the Senate by voice
vote.
2. The House Considers the Edmunds Bill
On March 19th, the House of Representatives received the Bill from the
Senate and referred it to the Select Committee on the Election of President
and Vice-President.249 On April 15, the Committee returned with a report
on the Senate version of the Bill. Because the Democrats had the overall
majority in the House, Democrats comprised the majority of the
Committee. Because the minority report was comprised entirely of
Democrats, the majority must have been bipartisan.250 The majority report
included two substantive amendments. The first amendment prohibited the
joint session from rejecting the votes of a state that that had “one lawful
return.”251 Under the Senate version, the two Houses could reject a state
that had a single return; the majority argued that they should not have this
power, which differed from the early position taken by the Democrats when
they controlled both Houses.252 This Amendment also inserted the word
“lawful” before return, apparently leaving open the question about whether
the two Houses could determine the single return was unlawful.253
The second amendment altered the rules for when the two Houses were
faced with multiple returns but not a determination from a state’s dispute
resolution system. In that case, the House amended the Senate Bill to give
246. Id. at 863–68.
247. Id. at 966.
248. Id. at 1064.
249. Id. at 2535.
250. H.R. COMM. ON THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT, H.R. REP. NO.
1638, pt. 2, at 1–3 (1886). The minority was comprised of Representatives Daniel
Ermentrout (D, PA), Lewis Beach (D, NY), John T. Heard (D, MO), Thomas D. Johnston
(D, NC) and Samuel Dibble (D, SC). Id. pt. 2, at 3. Representative Andrew D. Caldwell (D,
TN) was Chair of the Committee and in the majority. Id. pt. 2, at 1. The report does not list
the majority members of the committee. Assuming the remaining members were in the
majority, they would have also included John R. Eden (D, ILL), Lewis Beach (D, NY),
Charles H. Gibson (D, MD), James Laird (R, NE), Charles S. Baker (R. NY), John Hiestand
(R, PA), William C. Cooper (R, OH) and Seth C. Moffatt (R, MI). DAVID T. CANON,
GARRISON NELSON, & CHARLES STEWART III, 4 COMMITTEES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS
1789-1946, at 308 (2002).
251. Id. pt. 1, at 1.
252. Id. pt. 1.
253. Id. pt. 1, at 2. Later, the majority report noted that the two Houses are authorized by
the Constitution to determine “from the best evidence to be had, what are legal votes”
because they can only count legal votes. Id.
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the return certified by the state’s governor presumptive validity unless the
two Houses voted to reject it.254 The majority did not like that the Senate
version required both Houses to concur on the correct set of returns and
gave no set of returns presumptive validity, presumably because this would
give a single House the ability to entirely disenfranchise a state.255 Despite
these amendments, the majority otherwise agreed in large part with the
Senate Bill, for the first time in the course of the bipartisan Congress’s
work on the subject. Perhaps this was because, as expressed in the House
Report, both political parties finally realized that “[t]he interests involved
are too precious and the dangers too great to be left longer without adequate
provisions against trouble and discord.”256
The minority agreed with the first part of the first amendment, that the
two Houses should not have the power to reject the returns of a state that
submits only one return.257 However, the minority disagreed with inserting
the word “lawful” into that provision because it would give Congress the
prerogative to reject returns.258 The minority disagreed with the second
amendment on the grounds that it allowed both Houses to reject a vote that
had the governor’s certification, which would disenfranchise a state.259 The
minority also disagreed with requiring a state to resolve a dispute six days
before the meeting of the electors and to resolve the dispute using laws
enacted prior to election day, believing both actions went beyond the
Constitution in controlling the mechanisms of the state’s election and
dispute resolution.260 The Report was submitted to the House on April
30.261
Debate on the Bill, with amendments, did not begin until December 7.262
Representative Andrew J. Caldwell (D, TN), Chair of the Committee, was
the only member to speak that day. First, Representative Caldwell noted
that the Bill would be an authoritative expression that the power of the
electoral count was vested in Congress, not the President of the Senate.263
Next, he noted that Congress has the ability to create a law or joint rule
providing for the manner of counting the vote, and defended the power of
Congress to judge the legality of the votes.264 Caldwell noted that the

254. See id. pt. 1, at 1.
255. Id. pt. 1, at 2.
256. Id.
257. Id. pt. 2, at 3.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. pt. 2, at 2.
261. 17 CONG. REC. 4045 (1886).
262. 18 CONG. REC. 29 (1886).
263. Id. at 30 (noting the attempt of the President of the Senate to assume that power in
1857 and the allegations of a similar possibility in 1876).
264. Id. (“The power to judge of the legality of the votes is a necessary consequent of the
power to count. The existence of this power is of absolute necessity to the preservation of
the Government. The interests of all the States in their relations to each other in the Federal
Union demand that the ultimate tribunal to decide upon the election of the President should
be a constituent body, in which the States in their federal relationships and the people in their
sovereign capacity should be represented.”).
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intention of the amendments was to protect the states from any suggestion
that the legislation might be used to improperly disenfranchise them;
however, Caldwell emphasized that it was important not to go so far as to
inhibit the ability of Congress to reject unlawful votes.265
Representative Samuel Dibble (D, SC), a member of the minority report
of the Committee, continued the debate on December 8. His primary
contention was that the electoral returns of a state that are certified under its
laws should have prima facie validity when they arrive before Congress and
neither House or both Houses should be able to set aside this return “when
it is certified and presented in regular form and manner.”266 Additionally,
Representative Dibble took issue with the safe harbor date and insisted that
the states should have the full time until the electors cast their votes to
resolve any controversies. To do otherwise would impermissibly interfere
with the state’s power to determine the electors.267 Dibble agreed that
Congress was competent to legislate as to who had the counting power, but
took issue with the idea that the count itself could be a judicial act, rather
than a ministerial act of simply counting.268
Dibble did acknowledge that the act generally sought to constrain
Congress’s ability to judge the returns, but thought it still left Congress with
too much ability to insert its will into a dispute.269 Despite the issues the
minority of the Committee had with the Bill, Representative Dibble, in a
signal that the Bill stood a good chance of passing, noted that for the most
part, the Bill had the unanimous approval of the Committee and there were
no dissents to the main features of the Bill.270 Representative William C.
Cooper (R, OH), a member of the majority report of the Committee,
defended the Bill’s intrusions upon the state as limited, only arising if the
state has put itself into the position of submitting multiple returns.271
Representative John R. Eden (D, IL) maintained that the Bill, with
amendments, would effectively determine all questions and scenarios
265. Id. at 31. Here Representative Caldwell made an interesting point: Congress must
have this power in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. In the event that
the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number
of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Likewise, Caldwell noted that Congress needed to enforce
other provisions in the Constitution, such as the guarantee of a republican form of
government, in this regard. 18 CONG. REC. at 31(arguing that Congress would be required to
reject the votes of a state that did not have a republican form of government).
266. 18 CONG. REC. at 46 (noting that the Constitution did not give Congress the same
power to judge the electoral returns as it did to judge the returns of their own elections).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 47.
271. Id. at 49.
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relative to the electoral account while leaving the states to determine the
disputes.272 Further, the necessity of the legislation was “manifest,” despite
the fact that previous disputes were resolved peaceably; the law was still
unsettled and invited future contests.273
Representative George E. Adams (R, IL) maintained that he believed the
Bill would not bind the two Houses of Congress when they actually count
the electoral vote.274 Additionally, Representative Adams noted that the
legislation included language that would still permit Congress to make
judgments. For instance, in the event of two sets of the returns, the Bill
gave presumptive validity to those votes “regularly given.”275 This term, he
argued, was entirely subjective and ambiguous.276 Debate wrapped up on
December 9, and Representative Charles S. Baker (R, NY) rose to argue
that the Bill was unconstitutional, on the grounds that it strips power from
the President of the Senate and gives too much power to Congress.277 Any
remedy, in Representative Baker’s mind, would have to take the form of a
constitutional amendment, and he argued that this should have been the
focus all along.278
Wrapping up debate, Representative Herbert (D, AL), summarized the
case for a law and the history of the progress in Congress since the HayesTilden disputed election:
Mr. Speaker, this bill has come over to us as I understand by a
practically unanimous vote on the part of the Senate, Democrats and
Republicans. That body has four times passed and sent to this House this
bill, or one very similar to it. I hope the time has come when the House is
at last ready to pass the bill in some shape or other.
No question has been more thoroughly and ably discussed in the last
ten years than that involved in this bill—the counting the electoral vote.
Eleven years ago the country was on the eve of civil war because we had
a disputed Presidential election and no law provided under which the
count could be made. The Electoral Commission was resorted to. The
country submitted to the result, but was never satisfied with it. It was the
natural and perhaps the inevitable, result. The country never will be
satisfied in any political case with a temporary expedient or device under
a law passed at the moment, after parties had taken sides on the question.
The party losing under such circumstances will naturally believe it has
been cheated. The people of this country are law-loving and law-abiding,
but they want laws passed before cases arise, and not with reference to
any special case that may have arisen. When a party loses a suit under a
law passed beforehand, without reference to his particular case, even
though he may believe injustice has been done him, has no feeling of
personal wrong or personal indignation against the law-making power,

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 75.
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because he knows that human laws must be imperfect. . . . And therefore
it is that an unjust law, an imperfect law, is better than no law at all. Let
the people know beforehand what the law is and what they are to
expect.279

The House took up the majority of the Committee’s amendments. The
Committee abandoned the insertion of the word “lawful” without a vote but
the other amendments were agreed to.280 The amendments offered by the
Committee minority were rejected.281 The Committee’s amendments
passed by a vote of 141–109 with seventy-two members not voting.282 An
additional amendment, making a slight change to the committee majority’s
first substantive amendment, by Representative Eden was accepted and
changed the rules to ensure the Houses could not reject the votes when a
state submits a single return that has been “regularly given” and certified by
the state executive.283
Senator Hoar requested that the Senate non-concur in the House
amendments and he, Senator Edmunds (R) and Senator James L. Pugh (D)
were appointed to the conference committee.284 The House appointed their
conference, Representatives Caldwell (D), Eden (D) and Cooper (R) on
December 14.285 The House conferees reported back on January 20,
1887.286
As to the substantive amendments, the Senate conferees agreed in large
part with the House, with a few changes. The first substantive change dealt
was to the House amendment on a state that submitted a single return that
was certified by the state executive: though no electoral votes may be
rejected, the two Houses concurrently may reject the vote or votes when
they agree that such vote or votes have not been so regularly given by
electors whose appointment has been so certified.287
The House Conference Report noted that this change would leave no
doubt that Congress could still reject a single return that was certified by a
state’s governor if it agreed that the return was not regularly given.288 The
Senate accepted the second substantive House amendment and the only
change the conference made was to the language of the second substantive
House amendment.289 The report from the House conferees noted that the
changes would ensure that a path for Congress was created for almost every
circumstance of disputed returns and, in the event that it fails, the two
Houses’ power would be circumscribed to a minimum to prevent the
279. Id. at 75.
280. Id. at 76.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 77. 130 Democrats voted in favor of the amendment, with ten voting against.
Ninety-nine Republicans voted against it, with eight voting in favor.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 133.
285. Id. at 187.
286. Id. at 826.
287. Id. at 668.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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disenfranchisement of a state.290 The Senate agreed to the conference
report with little discussion on January 20.291 The President signed the
Electoral Count Act on February 4, 1887.
CONCLUSION
The long meandering path to the Electoral Count Act, starting just after
the Hayes-Tilden election dispute in 1876, was eleven years in all.
Congress considered constitutional amendments, joint rule, and eventually
settled on legislation. It is clear that the nature of the early debate was
framed by partisanship on the part of the Democrats, stemming from anger
at the Hayes-Tilden disputes and what they considered to be abuse at the
hands of Republicans during the Civil War and Reconstruction Eras. The
debate evolved as this partisanship tempered and control of Congress was
split between the two parties. Still, the biggest hurdle seems to have been
the diversity of opinions various members of Congress had, a fact that
perhaps accounts for why the Bill had to be bi-partisan. In the end, the Bill
marked two aims. First, it attempted to resolve the question as to where the
power to count electoral votes resides by asserting this authority to be in the
joint session of Congress.
But, of course, the legislation by itself cannot conclusively defeat the
claim, based on the text of the Twelfth Amendment, that this authority lies
with the President of the Senate—or alternatively, the argument that it lies
exclusively with the House of Representatives in the event that there is a
debate whether any candidate has obtained a majority of Electoral College
votes. Second, it sought to protect the state’s prerogative to cast electoral
votes by allowing the states to give their votes presumptive validity through
election dispute laws and resolution and restricting the discretion of
Congress.
So why was Congress finally able to enact a statute in 1887, before the
1888 presidential election, rather than earlier, perhaps before the 1884
presidential election? The Edmunds Bill was essentially the same in both
years, and the partisan makeup of Congress was the same in both years,
with Republicans controlling the Senate and Democrats controlling the
House of Representatives. It is unclear why the conference on the Bill was
unable to come to an agreement in 1884–1885 but was successful in this
respect in 1887. One difference was a Republican President before the
1884 election and a Democratic President, Grover Cleveland, before the
1888 election, although it does not seem that this would have made a
practical difference in the particular circumstances: Cleveland’s VicePresident, Thomas Hendricks, died in office, and thus the Republican
President pro tem of the Senate (John Ingalls) would supervise the counting
of Electoral votes under the Twelfth Amendment. The election of 1880 was
close, but not in the same way the 1884 election was, with a deciding
margin of less than 1100 votes in New York. Two close successive
290. Id.
291. Id. at 828.
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elections must have had an impact on Congress, particularly since both
focused on the battleground state of New York, where allegations of fraud
and corruption were frequent on both sides. The especially narrow results
in 1884 must have amplified concerns. Congress must have also known
that the 1888 election would likely come down to another close battle in
New York, so they would have been wise to take these narrow scrapes with
disaster to heart. The 1888 election was indeed quite close, this time with
Benjamin Harrison narrowly defeating Grover Cleveland by 14,000 votes in
New York to secure the Presidency.292
The ultimate compromise was not necessarily hailed as a panacea. John
W. Burgess, a father of the field of political science,293 published a scathing
criticism of the Electoral Count Act in 1888.294 He regarded the Act as a
failure in several ways. First, it was incredibly complex, but despite the
complexity (or perhaps because of it) it was often ambiguous or even failed
to account for various scenarios.295 Much of the law required Congress to
accept votes that are “regularly given,” but Burgess noted that this language
is entirely ambiguous and without a single interpretation could lead the law
to operate in several different ways.296 Burgess was also especially critical
of what he saw was an abdication of Congress’s constitutional duty to
police the returns from the states and to reject improper electoral votes by
such measures as requiring both Houses to concur in order to reject a state’s
single return.297 Burgess hoped that this “makeshift . . . compromise”
would be temporary and Congress might eventually come to an agreement
to establish a “common arbiter between the two Houses.”298
There is no doubt criticisms leveled by Burgess were warranted. Indeed,
the first time the law was set to be tested, in 2000, confusion about the
statute reigned as “politicians, lawyers, commentators, and Supreme Court
justices seemed prone to misstate or misinterpret the provisions of the law,
even those provisions which were clear to the generation that wrote
them.”299 Perhaps then it is not surprising that some members of the
Supreme Court seemed to think intervention was necessary. However,
292. Again, there were allegations of vote-buying, fraud and corruption on both sides.
FOLEY, supra note 171.
293. John W. Burgess founded the Political Science Quarterly and was on the faculty at
Columbia University. Columbia University, C250 Celebrates Columbians Ahead of Their
Time: John William Burgess, available at http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_celebrates/
remarkable_columbians/john_burgess.html.
294. John W. Burgess, The Law of the Electoral Count, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 633 (1888).
295. Id. at 652–53 (“There is no doubt that the law disposes, in a complex and clumsy
way indeed, of some of the difficulties in the counting of the electoral votes . . . . [B]ut it
cannot be regarded as a solution in principle of this great question.”); see, e.g., id. at 651
(noting the failure to deal with the case of two state executives claiming the governorship or
whether a rejected state’s votes should be deducted from the number needed to gain a
majority of the votes).
296. Id. at 643–45.
297. Id. at 637–39.
298. Id. at 653. He hoped that this change would come before more controversy. Id.
(“The truth is, we want a new baptism of nationalism all around. Let us hope that it will not
again be one of fire.”).
299. Siegel, supra note 31, at 542.
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Court intervention was not something the framers of the ECA would have
envisioned, particularly since Congress consistently rejected the Court as an
arbiter of these disputes during this period.
So in this regard, Burgess’ criticisms were quite accurate: the ECA was
a failure and the drafters of the ECA would have been surprised by the
Court’s decision. Criticism of the ECA and Congress is warranted from an
objective standpoint as Congress certainly missed the opportunity to enact a
serious reform of the system. At the same time, perhaps we should be
grateful that any legislation was enacted at all, given the partisan strife and
inability to reach a compromise in the ten years following the Hayes-Tilden
dispute. The ECA compromise relied on effectively stripping Congress’s
power to reject votes or exercise discretion as much as possible. Perhaps
this was the correct lesson for Congress to learn from the Civil War and
Reconstruction Era; the Framers of the Constitution were mistaken to give
this power to Congress. And perhaps too it was impossible to expect
Congress to deposit that power in any other body, especially if such a
solution required constitutional amendment, since such a compromise
would have required even more support.
Still, the problems with the Twelfth Amendment and Electoral Count Act
remain. If intervention by the Supreme Court is not a desirable solution,
then Congress must act again to fix this gap in presidential succession.
There is no reason that Congress could not consider solutions now, but one
lesson from the Electoral Count Act is that the measure must and should be
bipartisan; thus it might be best for any serious debate to take place during a
period of some level of shared power between Republicans and Democrats.
Additionally, Bush v. Gore certainly stirred partisan sentiments in the
country, but not to the same degree that Hayes-Tilden did because of the
historical context of that dispute. As the ten year anniversary of the Bush v.
Gore decision approaches, the relative recentness of the events should be
used as an opportunity to revisit the narrowly avoided constitutional crisis
and think about how we might avoid the next one.
To that end, now is the perfect time for all interested parties to make
proposals. Senator Edmunds hoped the Electoral Commission might serve
the role of neutral arbiter of the Hayes-Tilden dispute, and Senator Hoar
thought some body other than Congress was the best arbiter of future
disputes. Even with the attempts to tie the hands of Congress with the
Electoral Count Act, it looked as if Congress might face deadlock and
partisanship under the ECA in 2000. These ideals of Senators Edmunds
and Hoar should not be lost on us today, and the goal should be to make
some other neutral or bipartisan body the arbiter of these disputes.
The point is not to let the aftermath of Bush v. Gore and the continuing
interest in electoral reform during this past decade become another lost
opportunity, in the way that the decade after the Hayes-Tilden dispute
regrettably was. Recognizing the difficulties of overcoming the partisan
and institutional obstacles to reform, one should also understand the
paramount national need to surmount these difficulties. The next time there
is a disputed presidential election and there is a partisan deadlock in
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Congress, as there was in 1876 and 2000, let us hope that there has been
sufficient leadership to give the nation an authoritative and evenhanded
tribunal that can fairly adjudicate the dispute.

